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Abstract 
"Special Treatment", abbreviated as ST, is used to mark the stocks, which are 
confronted with the financial troubles or other unusual difficulties in Chinese stock 
market. In this work, we examine 165 public companies that were "Specially 
Treated" from 1998 to 2003. We investigate why they were labeled as ST, and 
whether and how they got their market and operational performance improved. With 
a standard event study approach, we find significantly negative abnormal returns 
(ARs) in 20-day period surrounding ST announcement, but a positive cumulative 
abnormal return during a 10-month period after ST event. We find positive 
relationships between cumulative abnormal return and share restructurings which took 
place after ST announcements. Besides, our results reveal the connection between 
share restructurings and ST de-capping, that is, ST firms with share restructurings are 
more likely to exit ST status. Evidence showing that company's operational 
performances get largely improved in the post-restructuring years relative to the 
pre-restructuring level can provide the explanation for such connection. Moreover, 
we investigate the impact on ST firms' CAR, likelihood of ST de-capping and 
companies' operational performances from CEO changes, largest shareholder changes, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It has been more than ten years since China's stock market was re-established in 
1991. By the end of 2004，there have been altogether 1569 stocks with 952.8 billion 
circulating value listed on both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. In the fast development process, a large number of "unqualified" listing 
stocks emerge, which are mainly due to their poor operating performance and 
intentional violation of regulations and laws. However, due to the lack of delisting 
procedure for a long period of time, China's stock market could not perform its 
screening and motivating functions. The situation changed in May 1998 when the 
two stock exchanges in China, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, started the 
practice of classifying a listed firm as a special treatment (ST) firm when this 
company has some abnormal phenomena with regard to its financial status or other 
aspects, resulting in investors having difficulty judging the company's prospects, 
which might harm the investors' benefits and interests. 
5 
Since ST system is a unique mechanism that only exists in the Chinese stock 
market and there is no such mechanism in developed securities markets in USA, 
Japan and Europe etc, the ST mechanism has received little attention in the literature. 
Only a small number of empirical studies are available. For example, Yang (2002) 
studies the earnings management of ST firms, which may give rise to positive market 
reaction to those stocks. Bai et al. (2002) estimate the value of corporate control by 
examining the stocks' cumulative abnormal return surrounding the ST event. Ning 
and Zhang (2003) analyze 26 public firms that were specially treated in 1998 and 
conclude that "Special Treatment" policy is not as useful for corporate governance as 
it is supposed to be V 
Apparently, the designation of the ST status should have negative impact on a 
listed firm since its interim report must be audited and the daily fluctuation of its share 
price is limited to 5%. More importantly, if the ST stock continued to make losses 
for one more year, the ST firm would be further downgraded to a particular transfer 
(PT) firm before the abolition of PT mechanism in 2002, and will directly face the 
danger of being de-listed after January 1st, 2002 Hence, if the stock market is 
efficient, the firm value and the market reaction should be significantly negative when 
the company is labeled as ST firm. It could be partly supported by quite a few 
empirical studies on the delisted stocks from Western stock markets. For example, 
1 Written in Chinese. 
2 In our study, to be consistent, we take PT firms as same as the delisting firms. 6 
Meijos (1963) finds that 47 of 58 stocks delisted from the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (ASE) in 1961-1962 underperformed the 
market shortly before and upon delisting. O'Donnell (1969) presents case study 
evidence in which the delisting of a firm's voting stock results in a decline in value of 
approximately 9 percent relative to its unlisted nonvoting stock. Edelman and Baker 
(1987) find generally negative abnormal returns in a sample of 17 firms that were 
delisted. Jarrell (1984) examines announcement day abnormal returns for a sample 
of six NYSE firms that were delisted and four that were candidates for delisting for 
violating rules concerning corporate governance, and finds an average loss in firm 
value of 9 percent. Such share price impact has been explained by factors like 
diversification (Alexander et al., 1988), risk changes (Foerster and Karolyi, 1993), 
liquidity changes (Sanger and McConnell, 1986; Grammatikos and Papaioannou, 
1986a) and management signaling (Ying et al.，1977; Grammatikos and Papaioannou, 
1986b). Besides, there are still a few papers trying to dig out the reasons behind 
negative abnormal returns by using various data sample and specific cases, such as 
Brown and Warner (1985)，and Sun, Tang and Tong (2002). 
However, the Chinese stock market presents a surprisingly different picture. 
We could always see the stock price of ST firms reaching the sky high level. And 
among the "top gain stock list", there are several positions occupied by ST firms all 
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along the time. It appears that China's stock market reaction to ST designation is 
resoundingly positive. How come an obvious bad news would have the stock market 
turned on? Bai et al. (2002) point out that increasing competition for firm control 
following the ST designation is the reason for the positive abnormal return around the 
ST announcement. Yang (2002) believes there exist earnings managements in ST 
firms, which give rise to the positive market reaction to those stocks. However, we 
see their explanations not strong enough to explain the positive valuation effect of the 
delisting mechanism in Chinese stock market. In fact，the competitions on corporate 
control or share transfer are not so much intense since they are usually arranged by 
local governments. Thus, some new explanations are needed for this conflictive 
phenomenon. 
This thesis tries to provide a new explanation for the positive cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding ST events by investigating the role of share 
restructurings for ST firms. Share restructuring is defined as the restructuring 
activities with share transfers and share acquisitions occurred between two different 
parties. As we all know, the Chinese stock market, as a major vehicle for the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to raise capital and improve operating performance, is 
greatly influenced by governments. Up till now, access to listing in Chinese stock 
market has been strictly administrated by the central government. Before March 
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2000, Chinese stock market used "quota" system to control the number of issuing 
stocks, which is characterized by setting a listing “quota，’ for each province by central 
government. The listing quota, which is a precious but scarce resource, is allocated 
to each province based on certain criteria, such as location, level of development, 
liaison with central government, etc. There has always been fierce competition 
among the local governments for the listing quota. After March 2002, “quota，’ 
system was abolished and was replaced by "approbation" system. Under 
"approbation" system, companies could get listed only if the central government 
approbates its listing qualification. However, no matter under what system, when a 
listed firm becomes an ST firm, local government, out of concerns that it may "lose 
face" and more importantly, the valuable listing quota or financing channel, will be 
actively involved in the rescuing activities. "They would force the incumbent 
controlling shareholder either to present a credible restructuring plan, often requiring 
substantial resource commitment, or to give up its control to another party whose 
restructuring plan is more convincing" (Bai, et.al, 2002). Most of the ST firms will 
be restructured in the short term after becoming ST firms. Our study finds that share 
restructuring has a positive effect on the operational performance of ST firms, which 
leads to a positive effect on the stock price indirectly. In other words，the positive 
cumulative abnormal return could be explained in the way that investors are willing to 
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pay some price premiums to buy the ST stocks due to their expectation on the 
following rescuing plans after special treatments. 
There are a lot of studies exploring the impact of the corporate restructuring on 
financially distressed firms. For example, Gilson, John and Lang (1990), Asquith, 
Gertner and Scharfsterin (1994) examined the debt restructuring of the distressed 
firms. Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) examined asset sales by distressed firms. 
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) examine the actions of managers prior to filing for 
Chapter 11. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1996) investigate the relationship between 
the vulture investors and the market for the control on distressed firms. However, 
very few studies have been carried out to analyze the corporate restructuring activities 
of ST firms in China. Zhang (2003, written in Chinese) conducts a comprehensive 
case-study analysis of around 20 typical ST and PT firms in China's financial market, 
which provides a rich collection of real world restructuring examples. Li (2003, 
written in Chinese) gives a theoretical analysis of the restructuring activities of 
China's ST companies. Ning (2004) believes that the ST system helps the 
financially distressed firms to improve their corporate governance. But there hasn't 
been any study so far that examines the impact of both corporate restructurings and 
local government support on the ST companies' accounting and market performances. 
Thus, our work fills in the gap. 
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Bai et. al (2002) is one of the few and outstanding pieces of research work 
studying the Chinese ST firms in the literature. This thesis is related to their research 
work but looks at the same issue from different perspectives. Same as Bai et al 
(2002), this thesis detects the abnormal market responses triggered by companies' ST 
announcements, and tries to explain such abnormal returns through various activities 
that improve the corporate governance such as share transfers from incumbent 
shareholders to outside acquirers. On the other hand, we are telling a different story 
from Bai et.al (2002) in three respects: 1) We select two event study windows around 
the ST announcements: a shorter one with -20 days to +20 days, and a longer one till 
10 months after the announcements. Quite interestingly, we find negative short-term 
response from the stock market, with the most significantly negative impacts 
appearing exactly on the announcement day. However, the positive long-term 
responses are in line with the results from Bai et al (2002). 2) Bai et al (2002) argue 
that the abnormal returns are driven by the contest for corporate control or ST firm's 
“shell,，value. We believe that the restructuring activities and the local government 
behavior can explain the improvements in operational performances, the likelihood of 
being de-capped and the positive long-term market reactions. We adopt both the 
company-level and province-level data to examine these impacts. 3) In this research, 
we not only investigate the market reactions to the ST events, but also focus more on 
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the rescuing activities taken by both companies and local governments. We try to 
answer through which method the ST companies could remove the ST label. 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 165 listed firms which were specially 
treated for various kinds of reasons between 1998 and 2003. Based on information 
available in Sinofin^ and CSMAR"* databases, we find evidence of restructuring 
activity for 125 firms (76% of the sample). We divide all restructuring methods into 
two large camps: share restructuring and asset restructuring. Share restructuring 
refers to those restructurings associated with share transfers and share acquisitions, 
while asset restructuring refers to restructurings with asset replacement, asset 
acquisition and asset disposal. 
Among 125 ST firms with restructurings, 51 happened within one year after ST 
announcements. 68 are share restructuring and 57 are asset restructuring. We 
analyze the reason why they were labeled as ST, and whether and how they get their 
market and operational performances improved. With a standard event study 
approach, we find significantly negative abnormal returns (ARs) in short periods 
surrounding ST events, but a positive cumulative abnormal return in a longer period 
after ST events, which is consistent with the findings of an early study of Bai et al 
(2002). The valuation effect of ST events has a positive relationship with share 
restructurings (share transfers and share acquisitions) after ST events, and the impact 
3 A financial database developed by China Center for Economic Research (CCER) of Peking University. 
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A financial database developed by Shenzhen Guo Tai An Information Technology Co. 
could be greater when there are CEO changes. Since people normally believe that in 
China, privately-owned firms are more profit-maximization oriented so that corporate 
under their control are more likely to perform better than state-controlled ones. Thus, 
we include the firm types of share purchaser (merger) into our consideration, and see 
whether they have positive effects on market reactions of the ST firms. We also 
studied the relationship between firms' ST status one year after being labeled as ST, 
i.e., ST or removed-of-ST cap or not, and the restructuring activities by adopting a 
Probit model. The results demonstrate that the share restructuring can help ST firms 
quit the ST status. 
The analysis of post-restructuring operational performance is another way to 
judge whether share restructuring can improve the ST firms' quality from the 
fundamental level. We use Wisconxon Signed Rank test to see whether the 
accounting data are improved after the share restructuring or not. The significant 
result proves the improvement of ST firms' performance, which is measured by 
operating income adjusted by total sales and total assets. Furthermore, the 
regression results also confirm that share restructuring has a positive effect on the 
operating income. Meanwhile, the improvement is positively related to the change 
of CEO, which means the new blood infused into the management team can averagely 
improve the company performance. All in all, we hold that the share restructurings 
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have a positive effect for the corporate governance of the ST firms and can benefit the 
investors. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
description of the ST mechanism in Chinese stock market. Chapter 3 describes our 
data and some descriptive statistics on ST firms. Chapter 4 provides the 
methodology applied in this thesis. Chapter 5 shows all the empirical results of our 
study and offers detailed explanations. Chapter 6 concludes the whole study. 
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Chapter 2: ST firms in China 
Since 1998，Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have classified some listed 
firms as Special Treatment (ST) firms. According to the "delisting mechanism" 
introduced by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a listed company 
will be labeled as Special Treatment (ST) firm if the firm experiences: (1) negative net 
profits for two consecutive fiscal years; (2) the shareholder's equity is lower than the 
registered capital (the par value of the shares); (3) while auditing a listed firm's 
financial report, the auditors issue negative opinions or express that they are unable to 
issue opinions; (4) in case a company's financial condition is considered to be 
abnormal by the stock exchanges or CSRC (For detailed regulations, see appendix). 
Until Aug. 2003, there are altogether 165 firms falling into the ST-firm category, 
among which 135 stocks were labeled with ST, 30 stocks with *ST ^ to disclose their 
^ "Special Treatment Warning System" started to implemented on May.l2rd, 2003. Stocks with significant 
delisting risks are labeled with "*ST" to disclose their special risks to the market. These stocks suffer (1) 
two consecutive years of negative net profits; (2) significant accounting errors or false accounting records in 
financial reports, and fail to be revised in the specified period of time or two years of negative profits arise 
after correcting the mistakes. Since the difference between the ST and *ST is not the major focus in our 
study, we take them as identical� 
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special risks; 64 stocks were once ST stocks but successfully removed of ST "hat" 
after the rescue, while 101 companies were downgraded to PT or finally got delisted 
from the stock market after one year since they were “specially treated" 
The purpose of implementing the ST system is to push managers to put efforts to 
enhance the firms' competitiveness, to protect the investors' interests, and to attract 
potential take-over actions. After a company is labeled as ST, it is under more 
stringent monitoring of regulators and investors. For example, the trading on ST 
firms is restricted so that their daily price volatility is capped within 士50/0. What is 
more important, if the firm gets worse, the regulation will get tighter: the listed firm 
with loss for three successive years is classified as "particular transfer (PT)" firm. The 
daily price increase of a PT share cannot be more than 5% to prevent insider 
manipulation. However, the price of a PT share is allowed to drop without limit. 
PT shares are only allowed to be traded on Fridays. And the PT shares can be 
delisted at the discretion of Stock Exchange regulator. 
Hence, ST and PT treatments diminish the value of the listed firms, and delisting 
makes the listed firms lose the valuable "shell", i.e.，the listing quota which is a 
precious resource in China. And it's not hard to understand why some listing 
companies use various means to manage their earnings to avoid being labeled as ST, 
PT or even being delisted. 
" T h e ST firms will be further downgraded to a particular transfer (PT) firm before the abolition of PT 
mechanism in 2002，and will directly face the danger of being delisted after J a n . r \ 2002. 
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On the other hand, when a company is labeled as the ST firm, it will usually face 
pressures from both insiders and outsiders of the companies, which aim to pull the 
firm's performance back to the right track as soon as possible. Pressures normally 
come from (1) provincial or municipal governments; (2) large shareholders within the 
firm; (3) potential outside bidders for the corporate control. It is widely accepted 
that share restructuring is one of the most popular methods adopted by these parties to 
save the ST firms. 
First of all, we think local governments have large incentives to initiate the 
restructuring for ST firms. Actually, this is not difficult to understand considering 
the governments' control of or impact on the stock market and their affiliated 
companies. Up till now, access to listing in China's stock market has been strictly 
administrated by the central government through "quota" system (before March 2000) 
and "approbation" system (after March 2000). The listing quota, which is a precious 
but scarce resource, was allocated to each province based on certain criteria, such as 
location, development level, liaison with central government, and the past 
performance of listed stocks from this province etc. Firstly, the central government 
establishes the total amount of shares firms were allowed to issue to the public in that 
year. Then each provincial government will negotiate with the relevant central 
government agencies about the size of the quota for that region. After the regional 
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quota has been allocated, the selected companies need to go through an individual 
approval process. The quota system, which serves as an important administrative 
governance device, could enable central government to have control over the size and 
stability of the stock market. But on the other hand, the system absolutely fuels the 
fierce competition among the local governments for the listing quota. Even under 
the new "approbation" system for stock issuance after March 2000，it's still not very 
easy to attain the listing qualification. Hence, when a listed firm becomes an ST 
firm, local government, out of concerns that it may "lose face" and more importantly, 
the valuable and costless financing channel, will be actively involved in the rescuing 
activities. Usually, local government would force the incumbent controlling 
shareholder either to present a credible restructuring plan, often requiring substantial 
resource commitment, or to give up its control to another party whose restructuring 
plan is more convincing. 
Secondly, the stringent quota and limits created huge economic rents for the 
listing right, called "shell" value. This shell value is primarily attributable to the 
access to costless equity financing. Firms need to go a long way to get listed. Once 
listed, the firm would find every means to expand equity financing for harvesting the 
bountiful "costless" money. Therefore, large shareholders of ST firms would like to 
keep this shell value through restructuring the firm. 
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Thirdly, the centralized and strict control over stock issuance disables a lot of 
firms to get listed on the stock market. Acquiring a shell is the only way to get 
access to equity financing for many firms without political clout. ST firms are a 
precious opportunity attracting them for the shell's value. As Bai et al.(2002) points 
out that, the abnormal return reflects the shell value, i.e., the external agents would 
like to pay this premium price to get the control of the firm. Moreover, our results 
demonstrate that share restructuring plans do help to improve the operational 
performance of the companies, thus the cumulative returns can be explained by the 
restructuring activities of the ST firms. 
Most of the ST firms will be restructured in the short term after being labeled as 
ST firms. According to Zhang (2003), the restructuring plan could be divided into 
two camps: share restructuring and asset restructuring. Share restructuring refers to 
those restructuring activities associated with share transfers and share acquisitions. 
And asset restructuring refers to the restructuring activities with asset replacement, 
asset acquisition and asset disposal，. Asset restructuring, in most cases, are 
implemented on large scales, mainly driven by the incentives of the controlling 
shareholders. The replacements include selling inferior assets to large shareholders 
and meanwhile purchasing an equal amount of superior assets from them. Value 
differences of the superior assets over the inferior ones are always exempted by their 
‘ Debt disposal could be seen as another restructuring method besides share-restructuring and 
asset-restructuring. However, due to its seldom use in real cases (only 16 stocks had debt disposal in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock market from 1998 to 2003) and no use in our investigated ST sample, we don't discuss mulS 
about it in our thesis. 
shareholders, which means the ST companies usually could get the superior assets 
free of charge. Besides, large shareholders agree to exempt the debts owed by ST 
firms, so that ST firms could achieve positive net profits in the coming fiscal year. 
Take ST Zhang Jia Jie (000430) as example. It replaced 148 million of bad assets 
such as accounts receivables, other receivables, prepayments and investment 
securities with 227 million yuan of superior assets without paying the price difference 
to its largest shareholder. And 20 million yuan of debt burden was relieved. Hence, 
Zhang Jia Jie obtained 17.38 million yuan of net profits with earnings per share (EPS) 
of 0.095 yuan to get rid of ST "hat" in 2003. 
However, most shareholders of ST firms could not afford such a heavy burden. 
Thus share restructuring is much more frequently used in all restructuring cases, 
which means incumbent shareholders sell their shares to another company who wants 
to go public in stock market by occupying the "shell" resource. According to 
statistics from CSMAR database, since 1998 till 2003, among all listed companies in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, 1063 firms (70%) had share transfers and share 
acquisitions, whereas with only 458 had asset restructuring. Similar ratio exists in 
Shenzhen stock market, with 586 cases of share restructurings. Along with share 
restructurings, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are frequently accompanied, and 
CEO changes, large shareholders changes, etc are also seen in many cases. In our 
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thesis, we will focus more on share restructuring activities that happened after ST 
announcement. 
Last but not the least, local governments' roles and impacts should also be taken 
into consideration. Local governments sometimes will allocate all means of 
resources under their control and employ the political power to rescue the ST firms. 
For example, some act as intermediaries to arrange the acquisition deal, some throw 
administrative pressure on major creditors or state lenders to exempt debts of ST firms, 
some spend government expenditure on the products of ST firms, and some directly 
grant more subsidies to ST firms. We believe that governments' incentives to rescue 
ST firms shall be related with the development level, listing quota size, government 
subsidy and expenditure budgets of each province. We will control and investigate 
all these variables in our studies later. 
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Chapter 3: Sample Selection and 
Data Description 
3.1 Data Sources 
In this study, we have used several databases for different purposes. 
To identify firms that have been designated "special treatment" (ST) since 1998 
till 2003，we use the WIND Information System provided by Shanghai Wind Co. Ltd. 
The WIND Database covers all companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges and includes information on stock prices and important economy-wide or 
firm-specific news events. When we search the WIND database for ST 
announcements made during the period 1998 to Aug. 2003, we are able to identify 
165 listed firms falling into the ST-firm category, among which 135 stocks were 
labeled with ST, 30 stocks with *ST to disclose their special risks. 
Through Sinofin and CSMAR databases, we find the subset of companies which 
underwent restructuring activities within two years after ST announcement. Sinofin 
22 
is a financial and economics database developed by China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) of Peking University, and CSMAR is a financial database 
developed by Shenzhen Guo Tai An Information Technology Co. We find 125 
companies out of 165 ST firms had restructuring activities within two years after 
being labeled as ST. We can also find a lot of information related to restructurings, 
such as restructuring methods, CEO changes, largest shareholder changes, and 
incumbent shareholder's province changes, etc. 
Besides, the firms' operational performance data come from Bloomberg, which is 
a leading database providing real-time and archived financial and market data and 
pricing, etc. Stock quotation data and market index quotation data come from 
Yahoo, com. 
3.2 Data Description 
Table 1 summarizes the basic information of 165 ST firms in our sample. Note 
that most firms entered into ST status in April-June, right after their annual reports 
being released and abnormalities in their operations being identified. We document 
several important characteristics of the ST firms, such as the industries they are 
mainly engaged in, the local provinces they belong to and the causes for being labeled 
as ST etc. 
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Based on the industry classification in CSMAR database, we divide the 
companies into six large industry categories: Industrials, conglomerates, finance, 
commerce, properties and utilities. Among the 165 ST firms, most of them are 
industrials (108/165, 65%), 27 are conglomerates (16.4%), 14 are commerce (8.5%); 
9 are properties (5.5%), 7 are utilities (4.2%) and none are fmancials (0%). 
As for the province distribution, Guangdong has the largest number of ST firms 
(34/165，21%) since Guangdong has the largest number of listing firms. Other 
provinces which have more than 10 ST firms are Shanghai (20), Sichuan (14)， 
Liaoning (13)，Shandong (11) and Hainan (10). Interestingly, Beijing just has one 
ST firm during 1998-2003. It is really a small portion considering the large number 
of listed companies from Beijing. We think this may be because most of Beijing's 
listed firms are high-tech companies established in recent years, or huge SOE firms 
managed by central government directly. These kinds of firms have small 
probabilities to be ST-ed due to their short listing histories or special backgrounds. 
Moreover, we also provide the distribution of share type. Among our sample, 
140 ST firms are A share and 25 are B share, representing 15.3% and 6.4% of all A 
share and B share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as of 
2003. It seems A share market has a larger proportion of ST firms than B share 
market. Actually it's not surprising, given the fact that B share market is mainly 
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targeting the oversea investors, and companies listed on B share market should have 
better corporate governance and quality control 
To better describe the status of the ST firms within one year after announcement 
dates, we create an indicator, STATUS, which takes value 1 if ST “hat，，is successfully 
de-capped, 2 for those stocks finally being delisted, and 0 for those remaining as ST 
firms after one year's time. Among 165 ST firms, 64 (40%) were able to 
successfully have their ST hats removed within one year and 101 firms are kept in ST 
status or being delisted from the market after one year. 
In order to study whether the status of the ST firms is associated with the reasons 
why the stock was labeled as ST, we studied ST firms based on their different ST 
reasons. From Table 2, we could see that the most common reason for ST is the 
company suffered losses for two consecutive fiscal years (95/165, 57.6%), followed 
by that the auditing result of the recent fiscal year shows that the shareholders' equity 
is lower than registered capital (62/165, 37.6%). Besides, 24 (14.6%) firms are 
dragged into ST because the auditors issue negative opinions or express that they are 
unable to issue opinions, and 17 (10.3%) firms are because their financial conditions 
are considered abnormal by the stock exchanges or CSRC. Note that there is 
A shares are listed and traded on the mainland A-share markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) and quoted in 
RMB. They cannot be traded by foreign investors on the stock exchange. B shares are listed and traded on the 
mainland B-share markets and quoted in foreign currencies. They are not listed on the Stock Exchange. In the 
past, only foreigners or foreign institutions were allowed to trade B-shares. Since Feb. 2001, Mainlanders have 
also been permitted to trade B shares, but they must trade through legal foreign currency accounts. Until 2003, 
there are 829 A shares and 54 B shares in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. In Shenzhen, there are 1358 A shares 2 5 
and 109 B shares. 
overlapping between different categories, since some companies were labeled as ST 
because of more than one reason. 
About half of the ST firms with reason 1 were finally de-capped of ST hat. 
Compared with about 60% ST firms still keeping the ST hats or being delisted from 
the market, they are in a higher likelihood to be taken off the hats. ST firms with 
reason 3 and 4 seem to have most serious problems and are more likely to be delisted. 
The results are within our expectation because the problems brought by the first 
and the second reason are easier to get solved or disguised through real performance 
improvement, earnings management, active restructuring activities, etc. 
Based on the information available in Sinofin and CSMAR database, we find 
evidence of 125 firms (76% of the sample) having restructuring activities within two 
years after ST events. According to our restructuring classification before, we find 
among 125 firms that 75 firms (60%) have share restructuring, which is defined as 
share transfers and share acquisitions, while 50 firms (40%) have asset restructuring, 
i.e., asset replacement, asset acquisition and asset disposal No company has debt 
restructuring activities within our investigating period. 
Table 3 summarizes the detailed information about the ST firms undergoing 
share restructuring. Several dummy variables are designed to describe the content of 
the restructuring plan, such as the change of largest shareholder and CEO, the change 
9 
For companies with more than one restructurings happened, we integrate them into one if the subsequent 
restructuring are made within one year and only the first announcement date is recorded in the sample. 
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because we believe it is most highly associated with the ST rescuing purpose. 
of the province to which the largest shareholder belongs, the change of industry of ST 
firms, and whether the buyers or controllers are private firms or not, etc. Among 75 
firms with share restructuring in our sample, 23 ST firms have their largest 
shareholder changed and 30 firms change their CEO. 45 firms have share transfer 
actions between two largest shareholders located in different provinces, and just a 
small proportion (7/75) of ST firms change their industry during the restructuring. 
In 23 cases of share restructuring, buyers are private owned firms. And in 14 cases, 
buyers finally become the controllers of firms. In table 3, we define variables for 
each of these factors respectively, and take value 1 as “yes，，，2 as “no，，and 3 means 
there is not any public information about them and they will be taken as missing data. 
To figure out the factors which can help ST firms successfully exit ST status, we 
compared the number of successfully de-capping firms under different conditions. 
Firstly, we divide the sample into two parts, one with share restructuring and the other 
without, to see whether share restructuring plan affects the likelihood of exiting ST 
status. Table 4 reports the statistical results. There are only 140 firms left in the 
sample since we exclude B shares due to lack of restructuring information. 75 
among 140 (54%) ST firms have share restructuring activities after being ST firms, 
but surprisingly only 24 firms (32%) exit ST status successfully after one year. The 
ratio is lower than the ratio for non share-restructured firms (31/65=47.7%). 
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However, this doesn't necessarily mean share restructuring activity has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of exiting the ST status. We still need to control other 
variables to get a clearer picture, which will be done in Chapter 6. 
Secondly, in table 4, we also investigate whether the likelihood of ST firms being 
"de-capped" depends on the content of the restructuring, measured as the following 
dummy variables: the change of CEO, the change of the largest shareholder, the 
change of province where the firm's largest shareholder belongs to, and whether 
buyers are private or becoming controlling shareholders. Specifically, for share 
restructuring activities with CEO change, 8 among 30 firms successfully took off the 
ST hats after one year. Only one out of 7 companies with industry change during the 
restructuring successfully gets de-capped. As for the province change, only 14 
among 45 exit ST status after one year. The result shows that the changes of CEO， 
industry and province are not useful in the restructuring, from the descriptive statistics 
at least. However, if the buyer is private entity, more than half (12/23) firms 
successfully exit the ST status after one year. Meanwhile, if the largest shareholder 
changes and if buyers are controlling shareholders, there are larger success 
probabilities, which are 10/23 and 6/14 respectively, showing that the change of 
management team of company have greater impact on company's performance. 
Overall, it is not clear from the descriptive statistics whether share restructuring 
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activities and other changing factors affect the status of the ST firms. We still need to 
control other factors to consider this problem. The analysis will be introduced in 
Chapter 6. 
29 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Event Study for Abnormal Returns 
Picking ST announcement as a signaling event, we can use a standard event 
study approach firstly proposed by Gershon Mandelker to calculate the abnormal 
return. Campbell et al. (1997) outline the procedures of an event study as follows. 
4.1.1 Definition and Observation Period 
The period over which the stock prices of the sample firms in the event under 
examination is called the event window, which is usually centered on the 
announcement date, which is designated a date 0 in event period. The event window 
aims to capture all the effects on stock prices of the event. Longer periods can 
guarantee that all the effects are captured, but the trade-off is that more noises in the 
data are added to estimates. For example, some event studies choose an event window 
of -20 to +20 days, i.e., from 20 days before the announcement date to 20 days after 
the announcement. 
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4.1.2 Normal and Abnormal Returns 
To evaluate the impact of an event announcement, we need to measure the 
abnormal returns (AR), which is the actual return of the stock over the event window 
minus the normal return of the stock over the same event window, in which the 
normal return is the return that people expect if no event happens. Abnormal return 
could be expressed as: 
A R , = R , - E [ R J X J (1) 
where \ X\ are abnormal, actual and normal returns for firm i at 
time t . is the conditioning information for the normal performance model. 
4.1.3 Models to Determine the Normal Returns 
To determine the abnormal return, we need to know the normal return. There 
are altogether three kinds of models to determine the normal returns in the literature. 
a) Market Model 
The most commonly applied statistical model in event studies is the market 
model. The model takes the following expression: 
Rit 二 仅 队 (2) 
where 
a^ is the intercept measuring the mean return over the period not explained by 
the market, 
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p. is the slope coefficient, which measures the relative risk of firm to the market, 
rj.^  is the error term at time t，which has zero mean and constant variance of 
b) Market-adjusted-return Model 
Sometimes when data is limited, we may use a restricted model such as the 
market adjusted-return model. The predicted market index for a firm at day t is just 
the return on the market index for that day. The market-adjusted-retum method can 
be regarded as a restricted market model with a . = 0 and Pi because a^ is 
usually small and the average p.^  over all firms is 1, the approximation generally 
produces acceptable results. Bai et. al (2002) apply this model to calculate the 
abnormal return in their thesis. 
c) Economic model 
Economic models add assumptions on investors' behaviour, so they are not 
merely based on statistical assumptions. A potential advantage of this model is that it 
increases the precision in estimating the parameters. Two commonly used are CAPM 
(Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965) and Arbitrage Pricing Theory Model (APT) (Ross 
1976)，among which we introduce CAPM only. 
The return generating function of CAPM model takes the following form: 
where R^ ^ is either the risk free rate or 0-beta return in time t， 
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a^ is the average level of superior or inferior performance measured over the 
estimation window, 
p. is the slope coefficient measuring the systematic risk of stock, 
1]“ is the error term with the appropriate stochastic properties. 
CAPM is widely used in event studies during the 1970s. However, in the late 
1980s, people are more inclined to use market model rather than CAPM since the 
constraints of market model is a bit slacked. 
4.L4 Market Model Estimation 
Since the market model takes into account the risk of both the market and mean 
returns and because of its simplicity, it is the most widely used model in the event 
studies. In this thesis, we will adopt the market model to measure the valuation 
effects of ST events by estimating abnormal returns around the public announcement 
dates. 
Let r = 0 denote the announcement date. The OLS coefficients of the market 
model regression are estimated over the period called estimation window: t = -120 to 
t = -2\. 
The length of estimation window depends on the requirement of empirical 
studies. 
R 丨t=仅丨 丨t (4) 
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By running the above regression model, we obtain the estimated parameters d^ 
and p. . 
The OLS is generally a consistent estimation procedure for the market model 
parameters. Furthermore, under the assumption that daily returns are independently 
multivariate normally distributed, OLS is also efficient. 
After estimating the parameters, we begin to calculate AR within the event 
window. We choose the period from -20 to 20 as the event window. The equation of 
AR for stock is: 
AR, = R,—先 二 及"—么-PiKt “ = -20 to 20 (5) 
We can find that AR“ is actually the predicted residual term of the regression. 
It represents the part of the return that is not predicted and is therefore an estimate of 
the change in firm value on that day, which is caused by the event. 
To cancel out the "noise" for individual stock returns, the residuals are averaged 
across firms for each day t in the designated period to produce the average abnormal 
return of the day ARt as 
I t =去 J a r , t (6) 
N is the number of the firms in the sample, t = -20 to / = +20. 
If we want to reveal the average total effect of a merger announcement over the 
specified period, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return, which is expressed as: 
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T2 
CARtiti [T, , T J e [-20,20] (7) 
t=T\ 
4.1.5 Statistical Inference 
We use a statistical test similar to that of Dodd and Warner (1983) and Travlos 
(1987) to see whether the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns holds. 
Hq : the average AR of day f = 0，i.e., AR^ = 0 
: the average AR of day f 本 0, i.e., AR^  本 0 
We also want to test whether there is significant cumulative abnormal return: 
/ / � : the Cumulative Average AR over event window [Ti,T2], i.e., C A R t i t 2 二 0 
/ / j : the Cumulative Average AR over event window [Ti，T2], i.e.， C A R t i t 2 本 0 
The test statistics of AR, and C A R t i t 2 are based on the average standardized 
A R (SARt ) and average standardized cumulative A R ( S C A R t i t 2 ) . 
1 N An 
S A R t ^ — Y _ _ i L t = -20,...,20 (8) 
SCARTXTI = ^ ，[7；, 2；] c [-20,20] (9) 
Here, S“ is the square root of firm i 's estimated forecast variance calculated by: 
S“二 幻 4 ( 1 + 工) (10) 
I Z(凡 
I L A 




L is the number of days in the estimation window 
R^j is the daily market return for the j th day in the estimation window 
Rmt is the daily market return for day t in the event window 
R^ is the average daily market return for the entire estimation window. 
We can define statistics Z i as 
Zj - V ^ x SARt, t = -20,...,20 (11) 
to test hypothesis that SARt is equal to zero. 
We can also define statistics Z 2 as 
N 
Z, = -——xSCARt (12) 
to test whether SCARTIT2 equals zero. 
If we assume that the individual abnormal returns are normal and independent 
through time t and across firms, Z1 follows a normal distribution. 
4.2 Models with Discrete Dependent Variables 
In our study, we will consider what factors affect the status of the ST firms after 
one year. The dependent variable Y is the dummy variable STOFF, which takes the 
value 1 when ST firms exit ST status and zero otherwise. Thus, we need to use a 
model to deal with the discrete dependent variables. We believe that a set of factors 
about the detail of restructuring, such as the change of CEO, the change of industry 
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and the change of firm types, gathered in a vector X, affect the status of the firms. 
We have the following assumption as 
= = (13) 
and 
Pr(7 = 0) = l - F ( X , / ? ) (14) 
The set of parameters P reflects the impact of changes in X on the probability. 
The problem at this point is to devise a suitable model for the right -hand side of the 
equation. 
One possible equation is 
F{X,P) = P ' X (15) 
Since 
E[Y|X] = F(X,y^) (16) 
we can construct the regression model, 
Y 二 E(Y I X) + (Y - E[Y I X]) = p ' X + s (17) 
This model is the linear probability model. If we assume 
(18) 
where function (j) (.) is a common notation for the standard normal distribution, 
and then we get the Probit model 
10 Partly because of the mathematical convenience, the logistic distribution, 
(19) 
1 + exp(y^ X) 
has also been used in many applications. This model is called the Logit model. 3 7 
However, we apply the Probit model in this thesis. 
4.3 Wilcoxon Rank Test 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is a nonparametric test for the null hypothesis that 
no difference exists between two variables. This test assumes that there is 
information in the magnitudes of the differences between paired observations, as well 
as the signs. Take the paired observations, calculate the differences, and rank them 
from the smallest to the largest by absolute value. Add all the ranks associated with 
positive differences, giving the statistic T十.Finally, the P-value associated with this 
statistic can be found from an appropriate table calculated by Wilconxon (1945， 
1963). 
For example, assume that (x,,兄.)，/= 1，."，《 are n independent paired 
observations. The difference d. = — x- can be calculated for each pair and ranked 
from smallest to largest by absolute value. 
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is defined as: 
(二 ix. (20) 
7=1 
in terms of the characteristic variates: 
JV’ ifdj > 0 1 
H / r ⑷） 
[0, otherwise 
38 
Chapter 5: Results of Empirical 
Studies 
In this chapter, we will introduce the results of our empirical studies, including 
the results of event study research and regressions. 
5.1 Market reaction to ST Events一Event Study 
We examine in this part the market reactions to ST events by calculating the 
short-term and long-term abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding the ST announcement. 
As mentioned in the data source section, we get the sample of ST firms from 
WIND Information System. After screening the data based on the criteria of time, 
region and listed companies, 165 ST firms are included into our event study research. 
However, before calculating the abnormal returns within the event window, we need 
to make a further examination of the stock prices data. We screen our original 
sample by requiring that the company has complete stock quotation data for two years 
surrounding the ST announcement date. We rule out some firms based on the 
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following two rules: firstly, those stocks with a long period of non-trading days before 
or after the ST announcement event and those stocks issued less than one year before 
the ST event will be eliminated from the sample because we could not get accurate 
abnormal returns as we want; secondly, a few firms got delisted after the transactions, 
so that we could not appropriately find their stock price around the event/^ This 
produces a final sample of 130 firms to be used for event study analysis. 
The market return is expressed as the market index return. We choose Shanghai 
Composite Index and Shenzhen Component Index as the proxy for the market 
performance because of their longest history and the widest use. Historical index 
data is gained from Yahoo as well. 
Next, we examine the short-term and long-term market reaction to ST events. 
To see the short term reactions, we calculate the abnormal returns during a short 
window. The event window is between 20 days before ST events and 20 days after 
the event. The estimation window (for model parameters) is -120 days to -21 days. 
Date 0 is the ST announcement day. We use the market model described in Chapter 
4.1.4 to calculate the abnormal return. Table 5 depicts clearly the average abnormal 
returns, the standardized abnormal return and their statistic test results. We find that 
there are negative daily standardized abnormal returns in most of days during the 
event window [-20,20], and with significant Z-statistics. What deserves attention is 
Note that the firms are just taken out from our sample in this specific event study of ST. 
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the result generated on date 0, i.e.，the announcement date. On that day, not only the 
abnormal return drops to the lowest level (-1.5%) during the period, but Z-statistics is 
most significant at the 1% level (-16.64) as well. It states that ST firms have the 
most significantly negative abnormal return at the date of announcement. The mean of 
the abnormal return for the whole event window is -0.24%, with standard deviation as 
0.47%. Thus, we could not reject the hypothesis that the average abnormal return is 
zero. The negative abnormal return is similar to the negative reactions to delisting 
firms in the western developed markets as we introduced in literature review. We 
believe the negative abnormal return indicates that the market still realizes ST events 
as bad news and respond negatively to the news initially. 
However, when we take a longer event window, we find that there is positive 
valuation effect for ST firms. Same as what Bai et al. (2002) did in their paper, 
weekly return data are used to calculate the cumulative abnormal return. We still 
keep 130 firms in our sample after deleting the firms with missing data. The event 
window is about 10 months long, from the 10th week after the ST announcement day 
to 48th week after the day, i.e. [+10,+48]. The estimation window is -60th week to 
+10th week, i.e.[-60,+10]. Market model described in Chapter 4.1.4 is used to 
calculate the normal return. 
Table 6 summarizes the results. The mean of the cumulative abnormal return 
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for the whole sample during the 10-month period after the ST event is as high as 
9.67%, with median 10.1%. There is a big variation in CARs, with the standard 
deviation equal to 36.2%. The lowest cumulative abnormal return is -38.5%, while 
the largest is 150.6%. 
To figure out the factors affecting the cumulative return, we also examine the 
cumulative abnormal returns for ST firms in different categories. We first calculate 
the CARs in two time periods: the first period is from 1998 to 2000, when the ST 
mechanism has been in existence for two years. The second stage is from 2001 to 
2003. We find that the mean of the cumulative abnormal return during 1998 and 
2000 is 35.9%, with the standard deviation equal to 42.1%. This result is consistent 
with that of Bai et.al. (2002) 
However, the positive cumulative returns seem to disappear in the second stage, 
when the average CARs drops to -2.9% with the standard deviation equal to 24.78%. 
There are two possible reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, Chinese stock market 
is becoming more and more efficient and the impact from governments is less salient 
than before, so that investors have more reasonable understanding of ST events 
compared with that in earlier years. Secondly，with the development of Chinese 
stock market and the abolition of the “listing quota" system, earnings management 
In Bai et.al. (2002), the mean cumulative abnormal returns of their ST sample during 22 month period 
surrounding ST data is as high as 28.99%, with median 31.32%. There is a big variation in CARs, with the 
standard deviation equal to 39.45%. 
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and government subsidy is less prevailing than before, which changes the investors' 
expectation of the potential rescuing activities conducted by governments or large 
shareholders 
We also compare the CARs for A shares and B shares. The mean of the 
abnormal return for A shares is 6.8% (33.75%) "，while for B shares the average 
CARs are as high as 26.38% (45.8%). The result shows that ST firms in the B share 
market have a 288% larger average abnormal return than that in the A share market. 
It seems that foreign investors give a larger positive response to ST events than that 
from domestic investors. We think the reason hidden behind may be because those 
companies with B shares are more inclined to take proactive rescuing activities to 
prevent the stock from being delisted, taking into consideration the fact that the 
company or local government don't want to “lose face" in front of foreign investors. 
Finally, we compare the mean of CARs for ST firms with different restructuring 
methods. From the last two rows of the table, we find that the average CAR for ST 
firms with share restructurings is 10.28% (36.79%), while the mean of the CAR for 
non share restructuring firms is 9.07% (35.83%). It is not very clear from the 
descriptive statistics to get whether these two camps of restructuring methods affect 
the market reaction differently. We still need to control other variables which will be 
introduced in the following chapter. 
Government rescuing activities sometimes work through large shareholders, which are SOE companies. 
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Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 4 3 
5.2 Relationship between Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
and Restructuring Activities 
In the above section, we have obtained the positive cumulative abnormal returns 
in the 10 months following ST announcement date. In this section, we provide a 
cross sectional analysis of the CARs. There are basically two questions we are 
trying to address. 
Firstly, we want to investigate whether corporate restructuring activities 
following ST events will affect the stocks，market performances or not. To see 
whether different restructuring methods have different effects on the ST firms, we 
make three regressions based on two large camps of restructuring methods. As 
mentioned before, the two large restructuring camps are shares restructuring and asset 
restructuring. Share restructuring includes share transfers and share acquisitions, 
while asset restructuring refers to asset disposal, asset acquisition and asset 
replacement. Two dummy variables Share—restructuring and Asset—restructuring are 
defined, which equal one when there is related restructuring taking place in the ST 
firm and zero otherwise. 
Secondly, we try to figure out what other factors give rise to the abnormal return. 
During the restructuring process, firms' CEO or largest shareholders are often changed. 
These changes may improve the operational performance, given the management 
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team's crucial role in corporate development. Meanwhile, since the listing quota is 
precious for each province, and local governments normally don't want to lose any 
listing company unless no better solutions could be found to rescue the company. If 
corporate control changes hands from one shareholder in one province to another 
shareholder in another province, it is also a signal. Since local governments 
normally have strong incentives to arrange the restructuring activities among the 
companies in their own provinces, so that they can keep the listing quota and 
financing channel, except that they couldn't find any good buyers within their own 
provinces. Besides, since people normally believe that in China, privately-owned 
firms are more profit-maximization oriented, so that corporations under their control 
are more likely to perform better than state-controlled ones. Thus we take the 
ownership status into consideration as a dummy variable, which takes value one when 
the buyer is private and zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable is the CAR for each individual firm, and the regressors 
are the dummy variables for different camps of restructuring method 
(Share—restructuring and Asset—restructuring) and other factors such as CEO change 
(CEO—change), large shareholders change {Largest—change), ST reasons {ST—reason), 
industry {Industry), whether buyers are private firms or not {Buyer j)rivate) etc. To 
control the governments' different incentives or impact from provinces with different 
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economic development level, we put some provincial economic variables into 
regression, such as GDP {GDP), Government Expenditure {GE) and unemployment 
rate (Unemploy rate) etc. We adopted provincial dummy variables to control other 
un-measurable factors of each province. 
Meanwhile, to investigate the effect of the listing quota of each province on the 
market reactions to the ST firms belonging to this province, we define the variable 
Quota as the number of listed companies divided by the total number of firms of each 
province. In China, each province has its quota to list companies on Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange before March 2000. Listing quota is very precious due to 
the huge amount of companies and tremendous financing demands from them. In 
this case, we assume that each province will make full use of listing quota, i.e, the 
number of listing companies is approximately equal to the quota number. Since 
listing quota is closely associated with the number of companies or the financing 
demand of each province, we control this factor by dividing the total company 
numbers in this province 
Direct subsidy from local governments to ST firms is also a common way to 
rescue ST companies by generating positive bottom line of net profit. To investigate 
the effects of government subsidy, we introduce two variables: Subsidy—ST_yr and 
Subsidy —1 yr—after, which refer to the government subsidy shown on Income 
Number of companies in each province is obtained from China Statistical Yearbook. 
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Statement on the year and one year after the company get ST-ed. Through this, we 
want to see whether government subsidy level in the ST year and one year after ST 
events have any impacts or effects on the firms' removal of ST caps. 
Table 7a shows the regression results on asset restructurings. We find that the 
asset restructuring is not significantly affecting the market performance of ST firms. 
The t-value of variable asset—restructuing is -0.572 and p-value is 0.569. 
However, when we investigate the effect of share restructuring on market 
performance, which is summarized by Table 7b, the significantly positive estimated 
coefficient (0.159 with p-value 0.043) of the variable Share_restructruing indicates 
that stock market reacts positively to the share restructuring activities of ST firms. 
This result confirms our hypothesis that the share restructurings, which are defined as 
the restructuring activities with share transfers and share acquisitions, have positive 
effects on the valuation of the ST firms. Actually, the result could be reasonably 
explained, considering the investors usually turn positive to the facts that there are 
new buyers or mergers happening to ST firms and hope that they could bring 
encouraging improvements to help the firms get out of ST status. 
The significantly positive coefficient (0.06 with p-value 0.046) on the 
CEO—change shows that ST firms with change of CEO can generally gain a larger 
cumulative abnormal return. That may be because the investors believe that new 
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managers normally can bring new approaches to the companies' management and 
operations, and hence improve their operational performances. Dummy variable, 
Largest change, also has positive coefficient (0.032 with p-value 0.42) but 
insignificant. It implies that largest shareholder change doesn't have as great impact 
as CEO change. Since it is a belief that China's private firms usually have a higher 
efficiency than SOEs, we also include a dummy variable Buyer jyrivate to describe 
whether the buyers are private entities or not. However, the result from our study 
does not support the hypothesis that private firms bring better market reactions 
according to the insignificant coefficient (0.04 with p-value 0.63). 
Subsidy—STjyr, which means the government subsidy level in the ST 
announcement year, has negative coefficient but insignificant (-0.021 with p-value 
0.518). Not surprisingly, Subsidy —1 yr—after, which refers to the government subsidy 
level in the one year after ST announcement year, has positive coefficient with 10% 
significance level (0.061 with p-value 0.077). It shows positive relationship between 
government subsidies level in the next year right after the year of ST announcement 
and the stock's market performance, which implies that investors react positively to 
the increase of government subsidy level and regard it as part of government's 
rescuing efforts to help ST firms out of ST status. 
Among the provincial economic variables, government expenditure (GE) has a 
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positive coefficient that is significant at 5% level (0.006 with p-value 0.04). 
Although we don't rigorously prove here, we can still believe that government subsidy, 
as part of government expenditure, helps to improve the market performance of ST 
firms. Provincial GDP {GDP) level has 10% significance level of positive impact on 
market reaction (0.002 with p-value 0.1), which illustrates investors are more 
optimistic about the ST firms from wealthy provinces. 
In table 7c，we include both restructuring methods into the regressions on the 
benchmark of non-restructuring companies, and the results reiterate our conclusions 
before. Share一restructuring still has a positive effect (0.158 with p-value 0.045) on 
stock market performance while Asset restructuring doesn't show significant impact 
(-0.044 with p-value 0.574). Government subsidy level next to ST announcement 
year [Subsidyyr—after), provincial GDP level {GDP) and government expenditure 
{GE) still show significantly positive impacts on stock market performances. In our 
results, listing quota of each province {Quota), industry {Industry) and ST reasons 
(^ST—reason) don't show significant influences. 
Overall, the cross sectional analysis adds to the evidence that share restructuring 
after ST events has a positive effect on the valuation of ST firms through their 
improvement in managing the restructured firms. 
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5.3 Relationship between ST Status and Restructuring 
Activities 
When a firm enters into ST status, both local governments and the largest 
shareholders or the controlling shareholders have strong incentives to rescue the firms 
due to the "shell" value and their own profits Government subsidy is commonly 
used to decorate the financial performance of those ST firms by turning the negative 
net profits into positive. Investors are willing to buy ST stocks even with a premium 
price in expectation of the rescue activities directed by local governments or the 
largest shareholders. Therefore, there should be a positive correlation between the 
cumulative abnormal returns and the status of ST firms. We define a dummy 
variable STOFF to state the ST status (l=de-capped of ST, 0=delisted or staying as 
ST). The correlation between CARs and STOFF is 0.12 with p-value 0.071，which 
could partly prove our estimates. However, we still need to control other variables 
to further confirm the conclusion. 
In this section, we use a Probit model described in Chapter 4.2 to see what 
factors can help ST firms successfully exit their ST status after one year. We use 
STOFF as dependent variable, which equals to 1 if the firm gets de-capped of ST in 
one year's time and zero otherwise Similarly, the variables that explain the 
magnitude of CARs can also explain how strong the incentive of the largest 
In fact, for most of ST firms, they are SOE firms, thus the largest shareholder is the local governments. 
Some firms can not find any information about their status after one year. These firms will be taken out 5 0 
from the sample due to the missing data. 
shareholders or the local governments have in order to take off the firm's ST hat and 
how likely they would eventually succeed. 
As to the regressors, we also use the dummy variables Share—restructuring and 
As set—restructuring to investigate whether the likelihood of ST de-capping is 
associated with the restructuring methods. Same as the section before, we include 
other variables, such as CEO—change. Largest—change. Buyer^private, ST—reason. 
Industry, Subsidy STjyr, Subsidy�yr—after, Quota and provincial economic level 
variables {GDP, Unemploy rate, GE) into the regression to examine whether they 
affect the likelihood of taking off the ST hats. Their definitions are the same as 
those in the above section. 
Table 8a shows the Probit model regression results with asset restructurings. 
We find that the asset restructuring activities have slightly positive but insignificant 
effects on the likelihood of ST de-capping (coefficient is 1.117 with p-value 0.167). 
This conclusion is consistent with the above insignificant result of asset restructuring 
on the CAR of ST firms. 
Table 8b summarizes the Probit model regression results with share 
restructurings. From the 5% significance level of positive coefficient (1.065 with 
p-value 0.05) of the dummy variable Share—restructuring, we can draw the conclusion 
that share restructurings can help companies exit ST status. This result is reasonable 
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and consistent with the positive relationship between share restructuring activities and 
CAR of ST firms. We believe such kind of positive relationship is derived because 
share restructurings, usually accompanied with company mergers, share acquisitions, 
main business changes and CEO changes etc, to certain extent fuel the new impetus to 
improve the firms' operational performance, and thus more likely to help ST firms 
exit ST status. 
We find positive coefficients on the dummy variables CEO change (0.24 with 
p-value 0.038), which indicate that the ST firms are more likely to exit the ST status if 
they change their key managers. Subsidy_ST_yr has 5% significance level of 
negative coefficient (-0.023 with p-value 0.031), while Subsidy —1 yr一after has 5% 
significance level of positive coefficient (0.043 with p-value 0.03). It shows that the 
higher the government subsidy level before the firms are ST-ed, the smaller 
possibilities the firms have to get de-capped of ST. But the higher the government 
subsidy level in the next year after firms being ST-ed，i.e., the greater efforts from the 
local governments to rescue the ST firms, the more likely the companies could exit ST 
status. The coefficients of ST reasonS and ST_reason4 are all significantly negative 
(-1.917 with p-value 0.007，and -1.973 with p-value 0.028). It shows that those 
firms which are labeled as ST due to non-operating reasons such as because auditors 
issue negative or no opinions (ST reason 3) and operations are stopped due to serious 
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accidents or law issues (reason 4) have smaller probability to be got rid of ST caps. 
The results are reasonable since non-operational problems are usually less easier to 
get solved compared with the improvements of operational performances, since the 
latter could be solved through restructurings, earnings managements or government 
subsidies, etc. 
Table 8c includes both restructuring methods, and the result reiterates our 
conclusion that share restructuring can help ST firms get out of ST status (1.642 with 
p-value 0.001), while asset restructuring has no effect (0.518 with p-value 0.248). 
From chapter 5.2 to chapter 5.3, the logic of our research is that firstly we show 
the positive relationship between share restructuring and stock market performance, 
and then we use Probit model to demonstrate that share restructurings can help 
companies to exit ST status, which could be one of the reasons why the market reacts 
positively to these stocks. Furthermore, in next chapter, we will deepen our analysis 
by only watching the stocks with share-restructuring activities, and try to explore the 
reasons why share restructuring could help ST firms get rid of ST caps. 
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5.4 Operational Performance Before and After Share 
Restructuring Activities of ST Firms 
From the last section, we draw the conclusion that share restructurings have 
positive effects on ST firms' getting de-capped. To explore the reason behind that, 
we will examine in this part whether share restructurings can help to improve the 
firms， operational performances, by comparing the pre-restructuring and 
post-restructuring accounting measures of profitability. 
Accounting measures of profitability are used by Hotchkiss (1995) to describe 
performance subsequent to Chapter 11 reorganizations. Similar variables are 
considered here for ST firms with post-restructuring data available from the Sinofin 
database. Among 75 ST firms with share restructurings, 68 firms do not have 
missing data and are used in this study. 
In this thesis, we consider five operational financial indicators: total revenue, 
operating income, total assets, operating cash flow, and net debt to the shareholder's 
equity, i.e., leverage ratio. Operating cash flow is measured as the cash flow 
generated from company's operating activities. Operating income is defined as total 
sales minus cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (SG&A) before deducting depreciation and amortization. We normalize 
the operating income by either total revenue or total assets, in order to exclude the 
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bias generated from company size. The return on sales measure is less directly 
affected by asset writedowns or divestitures and by differences in accounting 
treatments between the sample firms and their industry counterparts which are used to 
calculate the industry-adjusted term. All related variables are reported on an 
industry-adjusted basis by subtracting the mean of the industry portfolio consisting of 
1 
all other contemporary firms . 
Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics of the absolute and industry-adjusted 
mean values of the accounting variables in three full fiscal years surrounding the share 
restructuring events. The 3-year time period is from the year before the share 
restructuring event till the next two years following the restructuring. 
The negative industry-adjusted operating income over total sales (-0.167) and 
total assets (-0.014) in the year preceding the share restructuring event shows that 
most of ST firms' performances are worse than the industry mean. 
Here we use Wilcoxon Signed Rank test introduced in Chapter 4.3 to see whether 
the operational performances have been improved or not with time goes by. The 
result is significant for the operating income normalized by total assets from the year 
-1 to +1 (mean value turns from -0.014 to 0.045 with 5% significance level), i.e., the 
performance has been improved after share restructuring. However, the result of 
18 
The adjust terms are the mean of the related variables for all firms in the same industrials. We 
categorized all companies into six industries according to CSMAR database: commerce, conglomerate, 
property, industrials, utility and finance. Note that there are no finance industry firms in our ST sample. 
We calculate the mean of them during 1998 to 2004. 55 
industry-adjusted operating income normalized by total sales (mean value from -0.055 
to -0.37) is not quite consistent. 
Then we put CEO changes, largest shareholder changes, private buyers and large 
shareholders' province changes into consideration, and obtain the results by categories. 
From table P, we can obviously get that restructuring activities with CEO changes, 
largest shareholder's province changes and private-owned buyers will be helpful for 
the improvement of the operating performance (with mean values of industry-adjusted 
operating income normalized by total sales and toal assets all turn from negative 
numbers to positive numbers with 5% significance levels) 
When comparing the operating income between year +1 and year +2, the mean 
values in all categories in the second year after share restructurings (year +2) are 
better than those in year +1’ although some of them are significant and some are not. 
Operating incomes normalized by total sales of all share restructured firms are 
significantly changed from year +1 to +2 (mean values from -0.37 to 0.28 with 5% 
significance level). All in all, by combining the mean value changes from year -1 to 
year +2, we can draw the conclusion that share restructuring plans help to improve the 
operational performance within two years after restructuring activities. 
So far, we have further completed our argument by showing that share 
restructurings help to improve the companies' operational performance, so that the 
19 
For example, mean value of industry-adjusted operating income over total sales of restructured firms with 
CEO change changes from -0.37 in year -1 to 0.032 in year +1 with 5% significane level. 5 6 
companies with these restructuring activities are more likely to exit ST status, and 
thus the market reacts positively to the ST firms with share restructuring plans 
through the positive long-term CAR. 
5.5 Regression Results of Operational Performance 
Before and After Share Restructuring Activities 
Lastly, to examine the factors affecting the operational performance during the 
share restructuring process, we also conduct an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression on the operating incomes. Dependent variable is the industry-adjusted 
performance in the first fiscal year after share restructuring, measured as operating 
profits normalized by total assets of ST companies (which is significantly positive 
according to table 9) subtracts the mean for all counterpart firms in the same industry 
and the same year. 
As to the regressors, total assets, leverage ratio and pre-restructuring 
industry-adjusted performance are measured in the last full fiscal year prior to 
restructuring {Pre—operating income. Pre—asset. Pre leverage). Dummy variables, 
such as CEO—change. Province—change, Largest一 change and Private一buyer, are 
defined the same as those in the above section. 
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Table 10 summarizes the results. We find that the change of CEO has a positive 
effect which is at 10% significance level on the operational performance measured as 
industry-adjusted operating income/total assets, with estimated coefficient 0.42 and 
p-value 0.10. The result implies that the new managers usually will try their best to 
manage the firms and their efforts do pay off. 
On the other hand, it's quite straightforward to understand the significantly 
positive coefficient of the variable Pre—operating—income (0.42 with p-value 0.0017), 
which means the better the ST firms performed before share restructurings, the better 
they will be after the restructurings. The negative coefficient of the leverage 
measure (-0.00034 with p-value 0.04) also supports the theoretical prediction that the 
higher the firm's leverage ratio, the more difficult to reorganize the company and 
produce a better operational performance. Finally, it is worth noting that both the 
R-square and the adjusted R-square are high enough for this type of regression. 
Overall, the cross-sectional analysis shows that share restructurings add value to 
the ST firms by helping them improve their operational performances. In other 
words，the share restructuring activities are helpful for the corporate governance of the 
ST firms and can benefit the investors. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
As a warning signal of stock delisting from the security market, Special 
Treatment (ST) system is a unique mechanism that only exists in the Chinese stock 
market and there is no such mechanism in developed securities market. Obviously, 
being labeled as ST should be a bad news for a listing company since it will be subject 
to more restrictions such as interim report must be audited and the daily fluctuation of 
its share price is limited to 5%. More importantly, if the ST stock continues to make 
loss for one more year, the ST firm will be further downgraded to a particular transfer 
(PT) firm before the abolition of PT mechanism in 2002，and will directly face the 
danger of de-listing after Jan. 1 st, 2002. In western literatures, there are many 
empirical studies supporting that delisting stocks or to-be-delisted stocks are facing 
heavy selling pressures in stock markets. However, the Chinese stock market 
presents a surprisingly different picture. We could always see the stock price of ST 
firms reaching the sky high. It seems that the market gives a positive response to ST 
events. So far, very few papers in the literature have provided reasonable 
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explanations for this phenomenon. Bai et. al (2002) is an outstanding piece of 
research among these few papers. 
Based on that, this thesis is trying to explain the positive cumulative abnormal 
return by investigating the role of the restructuring activities following ST 
announcements. Share restructuring is the main focus of our study. Through 
finding the positive correlation of share restructuring with long-term CAR and the 
likelihood of ST de-capping respectively, we reveal the fact that share restructuring 
can help ST companies get out of ST statuses. Then through comparing the 
operational performance before and after restructuring activities of ST firms, we 
further supported the fact with the reason that share restructuring activities do 
improve the companies' operational performance within two years' time after 
restructuring, thus they help the companies get out of ST statuses, and hence the 
market reacts positively to the stocks with share restructurings. Following such logic, 
our study provides a possible explanation to the conflictive phenomenon existing in 
Chinese stock market. 
The main contributions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, with a standard 
event study approach, we find a significantly negative abnormal return during the 
short-term window [-20,20] days surrounding the ST events, especially within five 
days around the ST announcement day. The result shows that there is a short-term 
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negative reaction to the ST announcements. However, positive cumulative abnormal 
returns can be found for the ST stocks during 10 months after announcement. In this 
thesis, we provide a new explanation to the positive cumulative abnormal returns by 
investigating the role of share restructuring took place by the ST firms. Our results 
show that the positive valuation effect has a positive relationship with the following 
restructurings after ST announcement, and are greater when there are CEO changes 
along with the restructurings. We also see larger government subsidies in the next 
year of ST announcements, and higher GDP and government expenditure level of the 
province are positively related with the long-term CARs. 
Secondly, using a Probit model, we find the likelihood of ST de-capping is 
positively associated with the share restructuring activities of ST firms. We define a 
dummy variable STOFF, which equals one when the ST firm takes off its hat 
successfully after a fiscal year since it was special treated and zero otherwise. Our 
results show that the ST firms with the share restructurings are more likely to exit the 
ST status, especially for the firms whose ST reasons are the first two reasons: (1) 
negative net profits for two consecutive fiscal years; (2) the shareholders' equity is 
lower than the registered capital (the par value of the shares). The intuition behind 
this result is very obvious in that the problems brought by the first and the second 
reason are easier to be solved through active earnings management or restructuring 
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activities. Besides, CEO changes and the government subsidy levels in the year after 
ST announcements also show positive impacts on the probabilities of ST de-capping. 
Thirdly, we provide an analysis of post-restructuring operational performance of 
ST firms to see whether restructurings really help to improve the fundamentals of ST 
firms. We use Wisconxon Signed Rank test to see whether the accounting 
performance data get improved after share restructuring events. The significant 
results show that the operational performances, measured as the operating income 
normalized by either total sales or total assets，really get improved among three fiscal 
years surrounding the share restructurings. 
Meanwhile, the OLS regression results also indicate that the operating 
performances after share restructuring are positively influenced by the CEO changes 
and the performance level before restructuring activities. 
However, this thesis does not intend to prove that the ST mechanism is a good or 
efficient institution for all countries. It is not surprising if there are any findings of 
the opposite results in other countries. Basically, we want to state that, under a 
special economic and political background, like China, where local governments have 
large incentives to be involved in the rescue of listing firms and firms' CEOs are still 
appointed by the governments, the ST signal also has its special implications in the 
Chinese stock market. 
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Besides, someone may argue that the improvements of ST firms' operational 
performances resulted from the earnings management rather than the real 
enhancement in corporate governance and productivity. However, we still believe 
our research methodology is reasonable on the basis of: 1) the literature provides 
enough evidence for using the accounting variables as the proxy for company's 
operational performance, such as Hotechkiss and Mooradian (1997); 2) Given that all 
ST firms have quite similar incentives to manage their earnings, the earnings 
management could cause the whole ST firm sample to have similar degree of earnings 
inflation. Since we are mainly interested in the variation of ST firm performance in 
response to various corporate restructuring and government rescue activities, we can 
still detect what determines the cross-firm variation in corporate performance even if 
they have a common tendency to inflate earnings. Our results won't be biased too 
much. Last but not least, constrained by the available information and data, we think 
the current methodology is the best way we can use for this thesis. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Companies entering into ST status during 1998-2003 
By searching WIND Database provided by Shanghai WIND Co.Ltd, we identify 165 ST firms during 
1998-2003. For each ST firms, we document the industry, province, shares type, ST date and the 
reason why the firms become ST. We also follow up the firm for one year after they became ST and 
search whether the firm has taken off its ST or still kept the ST within one year. In the table, STATUS 
is defined as a variable with value 1 if the firm successfully exits ST status, i.e, de-capped of ST，0 if 
the firm stays in the ST status and 2 for the being-delisted firms after one year. ST reason is also a 
variable, which stands for the following four reasons: (1) negative net profits for two consecutive fiscal 
years; (2) the shareholders' equity is lower than the registered capital (the par value of the shares); (3) 
while auditing a listed firm's financial report, the auditors issue negative opinions or express that they 
are unable to issue opinions; (4) a firms' operations have been stopped, and there is no hope of them 
being restored within three months due to a natural disaster or serious accident or if the firm is involved 
in a damaging lawsuit or arbitration, etc. 
Number of observations: 165 
Shares ST 
Stock Code Industrials Province ST Date STATUS 
一 Type Reason 
600647 Commerce Shanghai A 4/29/1998 0 2 
600083 Industrials Sichuan A 5/4/1998 2 4 
000015 Industrials Guangdong A 5/4/1998 2 2 
600813 Industrials Liaoning A 5/4/1998 2 1 
200015 Industrials Guangdong B 5/4/1998 2 2 
600670 Commerce Jilin A 5/5/1998 2 1&2 
600852 Conglomerates Sichuan A 6/5/1998 1 4 
600892 Commerce Hebei A 6/8/1998 1 4 
000049 Properties Guangdong A 6/10/1998 1 4 
000030 Industrials Guangdong A 6/15/1998 1 3 
200030 Industrials Guangdong B 6/15/1998 1 4 
600847 Industrials Chongqing A 4/23/1999 1 1&2 
000020 Industrials Guangdong A 4/27/1999 1 1 
200020 Industrials Guangdong B 4/27/1999 1 1 
000536 Industrials Fujian A 4/29/1999 1 1 
600691 Industrials Sichuan A 4/29/1999 1 1 
600876 Industrials Henan A 4/29/1999 1 1 
000555 Industrials Guangdong A 4/29/1999 1 1 
000566 Industrials Hainan A 4/29/1999 1 1 
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600715 Industrials Liaoning A 4/29/1999 1 1 
600818 Industrials Shanghai A 4/29/1999 2 1 
900915 Industrials Shanghai B 4/29/1999 2 1 
000556 Utilities Hainan A 5/4/1999 2 2 
600625 Industrials Shanghai A 5/4/1999 2 1 
000017 Industrials Guangdong A 5/4/1999 0 1&2 
000588 Industrials Guangdong A 5/4/1999 2 3 
000613 Commerce Hainan A 5/4/1999 2 3 
600758 Conglomerates Liaoning A 5/4/1999 1 3 
600759 Conglomerates Hainan A 5/4/1999 2 2 
200017 Industrials Guangdong B 5/4/1999 0 1&2 
200057 Utilities Guangdong B 5/4/1999 0 4 
200613 Commerce Hainan B 5/4/1999 2 3 
900931 Industrials Shanghai B 5/4/1999 2 1 
000653 Industrials Fujian A 2/21/2000 2 4 
000411 Industrials Zhejiang A 4/7/2000 2 1 
000025 Industrials Guangdong A 4/19/2000 0 2 
200025 Industrials Guangdong B 4/19/2000 0 2 
000546 Industrials Jilin A 4/21/2000 2 1&2 
001696 Industrials Sichuan A 4/26/2000 1 2 
600137 Industrials Sichuan A 4/26/2000 1 2 
000689 Conglomerates Guangdong A 4/28/2000 2 4 
600629 Industrials Shanghai A 4/28/2000 2 4 
000003 Conglomerates Guangdong A 5/9/2000 2 1&2 
000011 Properties Guangdong A 5/9/2000 0 2 
000585 Industrials Liaoning A 5/9/2000 2 3 
000592 Properties Fujian A 5/9/2000 0 1&2 
200003 Conglomerates Guangdong B 5/9/2000 2 1&2 
200011 Properties Guangdong B 5/9/2000 0 2 
000658 Industrials Fujian A 5/10/2000 2 3 
000838 Industrials Sichuan A 2/19/2001 1 1&2 
000675 Industrials Sichuan A 2/21/2001 2 1&2 
600743 Industrials Hebei A 2/21/2001 2 1&2 
000535 Industrials Hubei A 3/7/2001 0 4 
000047 Properties Guangdong A 4/9/2001 2 1&2 
000788 Industrials Chongqing A 4/18/2001 0 1 
600753 Industrials Henan A 4/24/2001 0 1&2 
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000430 Commerce Hunan A 4/27/2001 1 1 
000048 Conglomerates Guangdong A 5/8/2001 0 2 
600848 Industrials Shanghai A 5/8/2001 0 1&2 
900928 Industrials Shanghai B 5/8/2001 0 1 
600763 Industrials Xinjiang A 6/26/2001 0 4 
600893 Conglomerates Jilin A 10/10/2001 1 4 
600709 Conglomerates Hebei A 3/19/2002 2 4 
600603 Properties Shanghai A 3/26/2002 1 4 
000678 Industrials Hebei A 3/27/2002 2 1 
000851 Conglomerates Guizhou A 3/27/2002 2 1 
000571 Industrials Hainan A 3/29/2002 1 1 
000586 Conglomerates Sichuan A 4/8/2002 1 1 
600669 Industrials Liaoning A 4/9/2002 2 2 
600786 Industrials Sichuan A 4/17/2002 1 2 
000405 Industrials Guangdong A 4/17/2002 2 1 
000885 Industrials Henan A 4/17/2002 2 1 
600858 Conglomerates Shandong A 4/17/2002 2 1 
200054 Industrials Chongqing B 4/17/2002 1 2 
000560 Commerce Yunnan A 4/18/2002 2 1 
000567 Industrials Hainan A 4/18/2002 0 1 
000572 Properties Hainan A 4/18/2002 0 2 
000533 Industrials Guangdong A 4/23/2002 1 2 
000826 Conglomerates Hubei A 4/23/2002 2 1 
000603 Industrials Guangdong A 4/24/2002 0 2 
000618 Industrials Jilin A 4/24/2002 2 1 
000699 Industrials Heilongjiang A 4/24/2002 0 1 
600646 Industrials Shanghai A 4/24/2002 2 1&3 
600842 Industrials Shanghai A 4/24/2002 0 1 
000638 Conglomerates Liaoning A 4/25/2002 2 3 
000656 Industrials Chongqing A 4/26/2002 1 3 
600870 Industrials Fujian A 4/26/2002 1 1 
600698 Industrials Shandong A 4/29/2002 2 1&3 
900946 Industrials Shandong B 4/29/2002 2 1&3 
000412 Industrials Jilin A 4/30/2002 2 1&2 
000738 Industrials Hunan A 4/30/2002 1 1 
000008 Conglomerates Guangdong A 4/30/2002 1 2 
000150 Industrials Guangdong A 4/30/2002 0 3 
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000682 Industrials Shandong A 5/8/2002 1 2 
000013 Conglomerates Guangdong A 5/8/2002 2 2 
000544 Industrials Henan A 5/8/2002 1 2 
000557 Industrials Ningxia A 5/8/2002 2 2 
600799 Industrials Heilongjiang A 5/8/2002 0 3 
200013 Conglomerates Guangdong B 5/8/2002 2 2 
000594 Industrials I/Mongolia A 7/2/2002 0 3 
600862 Industrials Jiangsu A 7/19/2002 2 3 
000695 Industrials Tianjian A 2/18/2003 2 1 
600873 Commerce Xizang A 2/21/2003 2 1 
000809 Industrials Sichuan A 2/24/2003 0 1 
600784 Conglomerates Shandong A 3/3/2003 1 1&2 
600807 Commerce Shandong A 3/7/2003 0 1&2 
600749 Conglomerates Xizang A 3/10/2003 1 1&2 
600886 Industrials Gansu A 3/10/2003 1 1 
600760 Industrials Shandong A 3/14/2003 1 1 
000710 Industrials Sichuan A 3/18/2003 1 1&2 
000801 Commerce Sichuan A 3/26/2003 1 1&2 
000409 Industrials Guangdong A 4/1/2003 2 1 
600385 Industrials Shandong A 4/9/2003 0 2 
000980 Industrials Anhui A 4/10/2003 1 1 
000570 Industrials Jiangsu A 4/11/2003 1 1 
000951 Industrials Shandong A 4/11/2003 2 1 
600139 Industrials Sichuan A 4/11/2003 0 1 
200570 Industrials Jiangsu B 4/11/2003 1 1 
000635 Industrials Ningxia A 4/15/2003 1 1 
000005 Conglomerates Guangdong A 4/16/2003 1 1 
000498 Industrials Liaoning A 4/16/2003 1 1 
000561 Industrials Shanxi A 4/17/2003 2 1 
600234 Conglomerates Shanxi A 4/17/2003 0 1 
000040 Utilities Guangdong A 4/18/2003 1 1 
000529 Industrials Guangdong A 4/22/2003 1 1 
600190 Conglomerates Liaoning A 4/23/2003 1 2 
600313 Conglomerates Beijing A 4/23/2003 2 1 
900952 Industrials Liaoning B 4/23/2003 1 2 
000718 Industrials Jilin A 4/24/2003 0 3 
600738 Commerce Gansu A 4/25/2003 1 1 
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000765 Commerce Hubei A 4/28/2003 1 1 
600182 Industrials Heilongjiang A 4/28/2003 2 1 
000505 Properties Hainan A 4/29/2003 1 1&2 
000621 Industrials Shanghai A 4/29/2003 2 1 
000927 Industrials Tianjian A 4/29/2003 1 1 
600695 Conglomerates Shanghai A 4/29/2003 1 1&2 
600769 Utilities Hebei A 4/29/2003 1 1 
600793 Industrials Sichuan A 4/29/2003 1 2 
600766 Commerce Shandong A 4/29/2003 1 1&2 
200505 Properties Hainan B 4/29/2003 1 1&2 
900919 Conglomerates Shanghai B 4/29/2003 1 1&2 
000418 Industrials Jiangsu A 4/30/2003 1 1 
600053 Industrials Jiangxi A 4/30/2003 2 1&2 
600672 Industrials Guangdong A 4/30/2003 0 2 
600878 Conglomerates Liaoning A 4/30/2003 2 3 
600781 Industrials Shanghai A 4/30/2003 1 1&2 
200418 Industrials Jiangsu B 4/30/2003 1 1 
200992 Conglomerates Shandong B 4/30/2003 0 3 
000660 Industrials Guangdong A 5/12/2003 2 1&2 
000670 Utilities Hubei A 5/12/2003 1 1 
000730 Industrials Liaoning A 5/12/2003 2 2 
600613 Industrials Shanghai A 5/12/2003 2 1&2 
600615 Industrials Shanghai A 5/12/2003 2 1 
600617 Industrials Shanghai A 5/12/2003 0 2 
600891 Commerce Heilongjiang A 5/12/2003 2 1 
900904 Industrials Shanghai B 5/12/2003 2 1&2 
900913 Industrials Shanghai B 5/12/2003 0 2 
000761 Industrials Liaoning A 6/27/2003 1 3 
200761 Industrials Liaoning B 6/27/2003 1 3 
600751 Utilities Tianjian A 6/30/2003 0 3 
900938 Utilities Tianjian B 6/30/2003 0 3 
600159 Industrials I/Mongolia A 7/1/2003 0 4 
600338 Industrials Xizang A 8/29/2003 0 3 
600899 Industrials Zhejiang A 9/19/2003 0 4 
600090 Industrials Xinjiang A 11/25/2003 0 4 
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Table 2 Distribution of the S T firms based on the ST reasons 
We map the distribution of ST firms based on their ST reasons, and also investigate their ST status after 
1 year. According to the ST mechanism, there are four main reasons for ST firms: (1) negative net 
profits for two consecutive fiscal years; (2) the shareholders' equity is lower than the registered capital 
(the par value of the shares); (3) while auditing a listed firm's financial report, the auditors issue 
negative opinions or express that they are unable to issue opinions; (4) a firm's operation has been 
stopped, and there is no hope of them being restored within three months due to a natural disaster or 
serious accident or if the firm is involved in a damaging lawsuit or arbitration, etc. Note that Some 
stocks were labeled as ST due to multiple reasons. 
Number of observations: 165 
ST reasons Number of Still ST or delisted Exit ST after 1 
firms after 1 year year 
Type 1 62 32 30 
Type 2 ^ ^ 11 
IVpe3 2A 5 
Type 4 17 n 6 
Type 1 &2 30 18 12 
Type 1& 3 3 3 0 
Total ^ m 64 
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Table 3: Summaries of the Share-restructuring firms 
Based on the information available in CSMAR and Sinofm database, we find evidence of restructuring 
activities for 125 companies, among which 65 (52%) are share-restructurings while the others are 
debt-restructurings. Several dummy variables are designed to describe the detailed characteristics of 
the restructuring plans. STOFF is a variable for the status of the ST firms after one year, 1= the ST 
firm exits the ST status, 2=the ST firm is delisted from the market and 0=the ST firm keeps the ST hat. 
Ind change is the dummy variable which equals one when the ST firm changes its industry and zero 
otherwise. Largest—change is the dummy variable to describe the change of the largest shareholder, 
which equals one when there is a change and zero otherwise. CEO change equals one when there's 
CEO change through the restructurings and zero otherwise; Province—change equals one when there's 
change of largest shareholders between different provinces and zero otherwise; Buyer—control equals 
one when the buyer finally becomes the controller of firms and zero otherwise; and Private—buyer 
equals one when the buyer is privately-owned company and zero otherwise. Note that for all 
variables, the value three means there is not any public information about them and they will be ticked 
out as missing data. 
Number of observations: 165 
Ind CEO Province Buyer Largest Private 
Code STOFF _ — “ “ ^ 
change change change control change buyer 
000008 1 3 0 0 0 0 3 
000011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
000013 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
000015 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
000017 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
000025 O i l 0 0 0 0 
000030 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 
000047 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 
000048 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
000150 O i l 1 1 1 0 
000405 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
000411 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
000430 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
000529 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
000533 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
000535 O i l 1 1 1 0 
000544 1 3 3 1 0 0 1 
000546 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
000555 1 0 1 1 O i l 
000557 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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(Continued) 
000560 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
000566 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
000567 0 0 1 1 O i l 
000572 0 3 3 0 O i l 
000585 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
000586 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
000588 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
000592 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
000603 0 0 0 1 O i l 
000613 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 
000635 1 3 0 0 0 0 3 
000638 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 
000658 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
000699 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
000788 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
000801 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 
000809 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
000826 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 
000838 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
000851 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
000885 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
000951 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 
001696 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
600137 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
600139 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 
600182 2 3 1 1 O i l 
600313 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 
600629 2 0 1 1 0 1 3 
600646 2 3 3 0 0 0 3 
600647 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
600669 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
600670 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 
600698 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 
600709 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
600715 1 3 3 1 0 0 1 
600738 1 3 3 1 0 0 1 
600743 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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(Continued) 
600753 0 3 3 1 O i l 
600758 1 3 3 0 O i l 
600759 2 3 3 1 0 0 1 
600760 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 
600763 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
600766 1 3 3 1 0 0 1 
600781 1 3 3 0 0 0 1 
600799 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
600813 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
600818 2 0 1 1 3 0 3 
600842 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
600847 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
600848 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
600852 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
600858 2 0 1 0 0 1 3 
600862 2 3 3 0 0 0 1 
600892 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
600893 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Table 4: Characteristics about the ST firms with Share restructurings 
This table compares the descriptive statistics for the share restructuring firms with those of non share 
restructuring firms. Note that there are only 140 firms in the sample V Share—res * CEO change 
means there is CEO change through the restructuring activities, and the same for other indicators. 
Although in this table we see smaller ration of companies exiting ST status with share restructuring 
activities than that of companies without share restructurings, we still need to control the other variable 
in regressions later to get a clearer picture on that. 
Number of observations: 140 
# Obs # firms exiting ST 
after one year 
Share一res after ST 75 24 
Share_res* CEO change 30 8 
Share—res* Ind change 7 1 
Share—res* buyers are private 23 12 
Share_res* province change 45 14 
Share_res*largest shareholder change 23 10 
Share—res* buyer are controllers 14 6 
Non Share—res after ST 65 31 
Total ^ ^ 
‘The sample does not include the B shares since we have no information about their restructuring 
plans. 
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Table 5: Abnormal return for the short event windows 
This table reports the abnormal return during the short event window of [-20,+20] days around the ST 
announcement event. ARbarl is the average abnormal return adjusted by the market index for date t. 
SARbarl is the standard abnormal return, and Z1 shows the statistics value of Z test to see whether the 
abnormal return is significant or not. After sorting out the data availability, 130 observations are 
included. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Number of observations: 130 
Date ARbarl SARbarl zl 
-20 0.0006 -0.01 -0.15 
-19 0.0028 0.11 1.44 
-18 0.0040 0.08 1.13 
-17 0.0017 0.07 0.89 
- 1 6 - 0 . 0 0 1 6 -0 .08 -1 .08 
-15 0.0040 0.05 0.61 
�-14 0.0003 -0.48 -6.55 *** 
-13 -0.0051 -0.75 -10.13 *** 
-12 -0.0049 -0.78 -10.54 *** 
-11 -0.0034 -0.68 -9.23 *** 
-10 -0.0005 -0.49 -6.60 *** 
-9 -0.0010 -0.55 -7.40 *** 
-8 -0.0020 -0.52 -7.01 *** 
-7 -0.0036 -0.62 -8.40 *** 
-6 -0.0045 -0.70 -9.44 *** 
-5 -0.0010 -0.49 -6.66 *** 
-4 -0.0035 -0.64 -8.67 *** 
-3 -0 .0063 -0 .80 -10 .86 *** 
-2 -0.0078 -0.82 -11.14 *** 
-1 -0.0087 -0.08 -1.03 
0 -0.0148 -1.23 -16.64 *** 
1 -0.0150 -0.83 -11.28 *** 
2 -0.0131 -0.38 -5.11 *** 
3 -0.0092 -0.34 -4.64 *** 
4 -0.0014 -0.24 -3.22 *** 
5 0.0014 0.04 0.50 
6 -0.0040 -0.05 -0.62 
7 0.0042 0.11 1.50 
8 -0.0022 -0.17 -2.25 ** 
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9 0.0039 0.18 2.49 ** 
10 -0.0010 -0.04 -0.55 
11 0.0044 0.06 0.78 
12 -0.0007 -0.10 -1.38 
13 0.0016 0.16 2.17 ** 
14 -0.0002 -0.07 -0.94 
15 -0.0045 -0.14 -1.91 
16 0.0010 -0.02 -0.28 
17 -0.0010 -0.02 -0.33 
18 -0.0026 -0.20 -2.64 *** 
19 -0.0014 -0.36 -4.81 *** 
2 0 -0.0041 -4.13 *** 
Table 6: Summary Statistics for the Long-term Cumulative Abnormal Return 
This table summarizes the 10-month Cumulative Abnormal Return after ST announcement events. 
We also break down the whole sample by time, share type and restructuring events. Non share 
restructuring is defined to describe the firms with no restructuring plans and other restructuring plans 
(asset restructuring) other than share restructuring. 
# Obs. Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
deviation 
Whole sample 130 9.67% 36.20% -38.5% 150.6% 
1998-2000 42 35.9% 42.1% -28.7% 150.6% 
2001-2003 88 -2.9% 24.78% -38.5% 75.2% 
A-shares 111 6.8% 33.75% -38.5% 66.3% 
B-shares 19 26.38% 45.8% -24.3% 150.6% 
Share 75 10.28% 36.79% -38.1 116.9% 
restructuring 
Non Share 55 9.07% 35.83% -38.5% 65.77% 
restructuring 
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Table 7: Regress ion result on Cumulat ive A b n o r m a l Return 
The dependent variable is the long-term (10-month) Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for each 
individual firm, which is gained from Chapter 5.1. The regressors include dummy variables for 
related restructuring methods (^sset—restructuring and Share—restructuring) and other dummy 
variables for the ST reasons, industries, change of CEO and largest shareholder change etc. To 
control the governments' effect, we put provincial dummy variables and economic levels into 
regressions, such as GDP {GDP), Government Expenditure {GE) and unemployment rate 
(Unemploy rate) etc. We also see the effects of government subsidy on the year and one year after 
ST events {Subsidy ST_yr means the government subsidy level on the year ST happens; and 
Subsidy—1 yr after refers to government subsidy level one year after ST events). Meanwhile, to 
control the effect of listing quota for each province, we define the variable Quota as the quota over the 
total number of firms for each province, to measure the listing-pressure of the listing quota for each 
province. 
Table 7a Regression results with asset restructurings 
This table examines the impact of asset restructuring to the stocks' long-term cumulative abnormal 
return, by controlling other factors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard 
Coefficients Deviation t value Pr(>|t|) 
Asset—restructuring -0.046 0.081 -0.572 0.569 
ST—reasonl&2 0.104 0.109 0.955 0.343 
ST—reasonl&3 -0.185 0.359 -0.515 0.608 
ST 一 reason2 0.109 0.104 1.054 0.296 
ST_reason3 -0.023 0.126 -0.179 0.859 
ST_reason4 0.054 0.181 0.298 0.767 
Subsidy ST_yr 
(mn Rmb) -0.021 0.062 -0.329 0.743 
Subsidy_lyr_after 
(mn Rmb) 0.062 0.038 1.569 0.122 
CEO_change 0.060 0.040 1.640 0.110 
Largest 一 change 0.028 0.071 0.402 0.689 
Buyer_private 0.040 0.088 0.490 0.630 
Industry一 Conglomerates 0.044 0.152 0.290 0.772 
Industry 一 I n d u s t r i a l s 0.053 0.129 0.414 0.680 
Industry—Properties -0.017 0.208 -0.082 0.935 
Industry—Utilities -0.107 0.278 -0.385 0.701 
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GDP (mn Rmb) 0.002 0.001 1.660 0.100 * 
Quota 13.410 57.140 0.240 0.820 
Unemploy_rate (%) 0.010 0.012 0.860 0.400 
GE (mn Rmb) 0.010 0.005 2.270 0.030 ** 
Province—Beijing 0.191 0.477 0.402 0.689 
Province—Chongqing 0.244 0.388 0.630 0.531 
Province—Fujian 0.341 0.396 0.861 0.392 
Province_Gansu 0.187 0.424 0.441 0.661 
Province—Guangdong 0.091 0.346 0.264 0.793 
Province_Gui2hou -0.235 0.481 -0.490 0.626 
Province_Hainan 0.189 0.359 0.526 0.600 
Province_Heilongjiang -0.006 0.413 -0.015 0.988 
Province—Henan 0.095 0.392 0.242 0.810 
Province_Hubei -0.024 0.379 -0.063 0.950 
Province_Hunan -0.010 0.407 -0.023 0.981 
Province_Jiangsu 0.325 0.407 0.798 0.428 
Province_Jilin -0.007 0.376 -0.019 0.985 
Province_Liaoning 0.282 0.358 0.787 0.434 
Province-Inner Mongolia -0.108 0.428 -0.253 0.801 
Province_Ningxia -0.164 0.420 -0.391 0.697 
Province—Shandong 0.052 0.360 0.146 0.884 
Province—Shanghai 0.022 0.349 0.062 0.951 
Province—Shanxi 0.499 0.480 1.039 0.303 
Province_Sichuan 0.258 0.350 0.736 0.465 
Province_Tianjin 0.061 0.551 0.112 0.912 
Province—Xinjiang 0.661 0.499 1.326 0.189 
Province_Xizang 0.276 0.387 0.712 0.479 
Province_Zhejiang 0.056 0.499 0.113 0.910 
Residual standard error: 0.3275 Adjusted R-squared: -0.1174 
F-statistic: 0.7053, p-value: 0.8712, Number of observations: 130 
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Table 7b Regression results with share restructurings 
This table examines the impact of share restructuring on the stocks' long-term cumulative abnormal 
return, by controlling other factors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard 
Coefficients Deviation t value Pr(>|t|) 
Share—restructuring 0.159 0.077 2.061 0.043 ** 
ST_reasonl&2 0.088 0.106 0.825 0.412 
ST—reasonl&3 -0.276 0.351 -0.788 0.434 
ST_reason2 0.113 0.100 1.129 0.263 
ST_reason3 -0.015 0.120 -0.126 0.900 
ST_reason4 0.065 0.173 0.374 0.710 
Subsidy 一 ST_yr 
(mn Rmb) -0.021 0.031 -0.650 0.518 
S u b s i d y l y r a f t e r 
(mn Rmb) 0.061 0.036 1.799 0.077 * 
Industry—Conglomerates 0.081 0.148 0.543 0.589 
Industry—Industrials 0.079 0.125 0.632 0.530 
Industry_Properties 0.022 0.200 0.110 0.913 
Industry—Utilities 0.027 0.278 0.097 0.923 
CEO_change 0.060 0.030 2.009 0.046 ** 
Largest-Change 0.032 0.039 0.84 0.42 
Buyer_private 0.040 0.090 0.490 0.630 
GDP (mn Rmb) 0.002 0.001 1.660 0.100 * 
Quota 13.41 57.14 0.240 0.820 
UnempIoy_rate (%) 0.002 0.002 0.900 0.400 
GE (mn Rmb) 0.006 0.003 2.030 0.040 ** 
Residual standard error: 0.3181; Adjusted R-squared: -0.05411 ； 
F-statistic: 0.856 , p-value: 0.6894，Number of observations: 130 
Note : All regressions include provincial dummies . 
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Table 7c: Regression results with share restructurings and asset restructurings 
On the benchmark of non-restructuring companies, this table puts share restructuring and 
asset-restructuring together into one regression and tries to examine the impact of both restructuring 
methods to the stocks' long-term cumulative abnormal return, by controlling other factors. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard. 
Coefficients Deviation t value Pr(>|t|) 
Share—restructuring 0.158 0.077 2.044 0.045 ** 
Asset—restructuring -0.044 0.079 -0.565 0.574 
ST_reasonl&2 0.084 0.107 0.787 0.434 
ST_reasonl&3 -0.296 0.354 -0.835 0.407 
ST_reason2 0.109 0.101 1.074 0.287 
ST_reason3 -0.03 0.123 -0.247 0.806 
ST_reason4 0.047 0.177 0.268 o.79 
Subsidy—ST_yr 
(mn Rmb) -0.021 0.032 -0.690 0.493 
Subsidy lyr after 
(mn Rmb) 0.062 0.035 1.784 0.079 * 
Industry—Conglomerates 0.084 0.149 0.566 o 573 
Industry—Industrials 0.092 0.127 0.711 0 483 
Industry—Properties 0.044 0.205 0.214 0 831 
Industry—Utilities 0.035 0.28 0.125 0 901 
CEO_change 0.033 0.042 0.811 0.421 
Largest—change 0.019 0.212 0.092 0.910 
Buyer_private 0.004 0.112 0.043 o 972 
GDP (mn Rmb) 0.072 0.041 1.660 o.lO * 
Quota 13.41 57.14 0.240 o 82 
Unemploy一rate (%) 0.003 0.003 0.861 0A2 
GE (mn Rmb) 0.052 0.021 o.03 ** 
Residual standard error: 0.3198 ； Adjusted R-squared: -0.06527; ““""““ 
F-statistic: 0.8327, p-value: 0.723, Number of observations: 130 
Note: All regressions include provincial dummies. “ 
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Table 8: Probit model regression for ST status and restructuring plans 
This series of tables present the empirical results on the factors explaining the relationship between 
restructuring activities and the likelihood of ST de-capping. The dependent variable is the dummy 
variable, STOFF, which equals one when ST firms exits the ST status after one year and zero otherwise. 
The regressors include dummy variables for related restructuring methods {Asset restructuring and 
Share restructuring) and other dummy variables for the ST reasons, industries, change of CEO and 
largest shareholder change etc. To control the governments' effect, we put provincial dummy 
variables and economic levels into regressions, such as GDP {GDP), Government Expenditure {GE) 
and unemployment rate (JJnemploy—rate) etc. We also see the effects of government subsidy on the 
year and one year after ST events {Subsidy_STjyr means the government subsidy level on the year ST 
happens; and Subsidy_lyr after refers to government subsidy level one year after ST events). 
Meanwhile, to control the effect of listing quota for each province, we define the variable Quota as the 
quota over the total number of firms for each province, to measure the listing-pressure of the listing 
quota for each province. 
Table 8a Probit model regression result with asset restructurings 
This table examines the impact of asset restructuring on the likelihood of ST de-capping, by controlling 
other factors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard. 
Coefficients Deviation Z value Pr(>|Z|) 
Asset—restructuring 1.117 0.607 1.342 0.167 
ST_reasonl&2 -0.386 0.606 -0.637 0.524 
ST_reasonl&3 -5.709 23.220 -0.246 0.806 
ST_reason2 1.979 1.400 1.413 0.158 
ST_reason3 -2.216 0.772 -2.870 0.004 *** 
ST_reason4 -2.382 0.997 -2.390 0.017 ** 
Subsidy 一 ST_yr 
(mn Rmb) -0.020 0.008 -2.442 0.015 ** 
S u b s i d y � y r a f t e r 
(mn Rmb) 0.041 0.020 2.035 0.042 ** 
Industry—Conglomerates 0.701 0.823 0.852 0.394 
Industry—Industrials -0.430 0.801 -0.537 0.591 
Industry—Properties 0.062 1.217 0.051 0.959 
Industry—Utilities 3.246 16.300 0.199 0.842 
CEO—change -0.628 1.415 -0.444 0.657 
Largest—change -0.474 1.624 -0.292 0.771 
Buyer_private -0.321 1.523 -0.221 0.791 
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GDP (mn Rmb) -0.018 0.011 -1.648 0.099 * 
Quota -457.800 484.800 -0.944 0.345 
Unemploy一rate (o/o) 0.002 0.015 0.135 0.892 
GE (mn Rmb) C ^ 1.041 0.298 
AIC: 150.94 
Null deviance: 142.546 on 102 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 77.287 on 60 degrees of freedom 
Number of observations: 130 
Note: All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 8b: Probit model regression result with share restructuring 
This table examines the impact of share restructuring on the likelihood of ST de-capping, by 
controlling other factors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard. 
Coefficients Deviation Z value Pr(>|Z|) 
Share—restructuring 1.065 0.548 1.963 0.050 ** 
ST_reasonl&2 -0.276 0.622 -0.444 0.657 
ST—reasonl&3 -4.734 23.230 -0.204 0.839 
ST_reason2 1.366 1.367 1.000 0.317 
ST_reason3 -1.917 0.710 -2.701 0.007 *** 
ST_reason4 -1.973 0.900 -2.191 0.028 ** 
Subsidy_ST_yr 
(mn Rmb) -0.023 0.011 -2.153 0.031 ** 
S u b s i d y l y r a f t e r 
(mn Rmb) 0.043 0.021 2.164 0.030 ** 
Industry 一 Conglomerates 0.660 0.812 0.813 0.416 
Industry—Industrials -0.067 0.769 -0.087 0.931 
Industry_Properties -0.012 1.267 -0.010 0.992 
Industry_Utilities 3.510 15.200 0.231 0.817 
CEO_change 0.24 0.119 2.076 0.038 ** 
Largest—change -0.156 0.597 -0.261 0.794 
Buyer_private -0.435 1.542 -0.281 0.771 
GDP (mn Rmb) -0.010 0.010 -1.006 0.315 
Quota -560.800 486.600 -1.152 0.249 
Unemploy_rate (%) 0.002 0.008 0.211 0.833 
GE (mn Rmb) 0.002 0.004 0.446 0.656 
AIC: 237.57 
Null deviance: 142.55 on 102 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 65.75 on 60 degrees of freedom 
Number of observations: 130 
Note: All regressions include provincial dummies. 
82 
Table 8c: Probit model results with share restructurings and asset restructurings 
On the benchmark of non-restructuring companies, this table puts share restructuring and 
asset-restructuring together into one regression and tries to examine the impact of both restructuring 
methods to the likelihood of ST de-capping, by controlling other factors. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard. 
Coefficients Deviation Z value Pr(>|Z|) 
Share—restructuring 1.642 0.504 3.260 0.001 *** 
Asset_restructuring 0.518 0.449 1.154 0.248 
ST_reasonl&2 0.054 0.570 0.094 0.925 
ST_reasonl&3 -3.730 23.220 -0.161 0.872 
ST_reason2 -1.482 0.598 -2.478 0.013 ** 
ST_reason3 -1.342 0.715 -1.877 0.061 * 
ST 一 reason4 1.137 1.221 0.931 0.352 
Subsidy一 ST—yr 
(mn Rmb) -0.041 0.021 -1.978 0.048 ** 
Subsidy l yr after 
(mn Rmb) 0.054 0.024 2.332 0.020 ** 
Industry—Conglomerates 0.751 0.839 0.895 0.371 
Industryjndustr ia ls -0.180 0.786 -0.229 0.819 
Industry—Properties -0.238 1.165 -0.205 0.838 
Industry—Utilities 3.725 15.450 0.241 0.809 
GDP (mn Rmb) -0.004 0.007 -0.599 0.549 
Quota -414.0 392.8 -1.054 0.292 
Unemploy_rate (%) 0.004 0.005 0.829 0.407 
GE (mn Rmb) -0.003 0.006 -0.484 0.629 
AIC: 149.7 
Number of observations: 130 
Note: All regressions include provincial dummies. 
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Table 9: Performance of the ST firms before and after share restructuring activities 
This table shows accounting measures of operational performance for a sample of 68 ST firms that 
have share restructurings after ST announcements. Year -1，year +1 and year +2 are the previous full 
fiscal year, the first and the second following fiscal year of restructuring activities respectively. 
Industry categorization is based on CSMAR database. * denotes 5% significant level based on 
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests. 
Operating income/total sales Operating income/total assets 
# of mean Industry- mean Industry 
Obs adjusted -adjusted 
mean mean 
Year-1 
All restructured 68 -0.167 -0.055 -0.06 -0.014 
firms (1.63) (1.62) (0.26) (0.26) - - — - — 
Restructured with 25 -0.37 -0.28 -0.038 -0.0004 
CEO changes (1.07) (1.04) (0.066) (0.07) 
Restructured with 19 -0.11 0.014 -0.026 0.027 
private buyers (0.26) (0.29) (0.057) (0.07) 
Restructured with 22 -0.10 0.011 -0.023 0.024 
largest shareholder (0.35) (033) (0.061) (0.064) 
changes 
Restructured with 37 -0.18 -0.069 -0.02 0.025 
largest shareholders' (0.55) (0.55) (0.067) (0.079) 
province changes 
Year +1 
All restructured 68 -0.48* -0.37* 0.0004* 0.045* 
firms (3.65) (3.65) (0.18) (0.17) 
Restructured with 25 0.032* 0.17* 0.033* 0.036* 
CEO changes (0.99) (0.89) (0.11) (0.10) 
Restructured with 19 0.039* -0.129 0.008 0.059* 
private buyers (0.91) (0.11) (0.065) (0.066) 
Restructured with 22 -0.13 -0.02 0.016 0.063 
largest shareholder (0.61) (0.58) (0.08) (0.085) 
changes 
Restructured with 37 0.1* 0.22* 0.034* 0.079 




All restructured 68 0.16 0.28* 0.038 0.082 
firms (2.31) (2.31) (0.32) (032) 
Restructured with 25 0.18 0.28 0.046 0.084 
CEO changes (0.91) (0.92) (0.147) (0.15) 
Restructured with 19 0.4* 0.576* 0.005 0.05 
private buyers (1.61) (1.63) (0.068) (0.083) 
- - - - — - — — - — - V - - "" 
Restructured with 22 0.33 0.45 0.06 0.11 
largest shareholder (0.79) (0.81) (0.12) (0.127) 
changes 
Restructured with 37 0.18 0.298 0.021 0.066 
largest shareholders' (1.64) (1.65) (0.101) (0.11) 
province changes 
Standard deviation value in parentheses. 
Number of observations: 68 
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Table 10: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results relating to the operational 
performance and corporate restructurings 
Dependent variable equals industry adjusted performance in the first fiscal year after share 
restructuring, measured as operating cash flow/ assets minus the mean for all counterpart firms in the 
same industry and the same year. Total assets, leverage and pre-restructuring industry-adjusted 
performance are measured in the last full fiscal year prior to restructuring (Pre_operatingJncome, 
Pre—asset, Pre J ever age). The dummy variables for CEO changes (CEOchange), largest 
shareholders' province changes {Province change), private buyers {Private buyer) and largest 
shareholder changes {Largest_change) equal one when there are changes and zero otherwise. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimated Standard 
Coefficients Deviation t value Pr(>|t|) 
Pre_operating_income 0.419 0.123 3.398 0.002 *** 
Pre_asset ^ 0.129 0.194 0.664 0.511 
Pre—leverage -0.0003 0.0002 -2.129 0.040 ** 
CEO_change 0.423 0.280 1.66 0.10 * 
Province—change 0.274 0.308 0.89 0.379 
Private—buyer -0.443 0.351 -1.261 0.216 
Largest—change -0.676 0.326 -2.075 0.045 ** 
Residual standard error: 0.89 on 67 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.4213, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3055 
F-statistic: 3.64 on 7 and 67 DF, p-value: 0.00473 
Number of observations: 68 
a in the form of logarithm 
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Appendix I: Special Treatment System in Chinese Stock Market 
When a listed company has some abnormal phenomena in its financial status and 
other aspects, resulting in the investors' difficulty in judging the company's prospects, 
which might harm the investors' interests, the company would have "special 
treatment". 
1. The company's share and its derivatives (putting ST before the abbreviation 
of the shares and derivatives), and its trading quotation is to be published in 
another board. 
2. The daily quotation fluctuation for the company's share is limited to 5%. 
3. During the period of "special treatment", the company's half-year report must 
be audited. 
If a listed company has any of the following phenomena, it is considered to be 
abnormal: 
1. The audited results of the recent two Fiscal Year (FY) show that its net profit 
is negative. 
2. The audited results of the recent FY show that the shareholders' equity is 
lower than registered capital (i.e. the net asset per share is lower than the par 
value of the share). 
3. As for the financial report of the recent FY, in the auditing report, a registered 
accountant expresses a negative opinion or saying that he is unable to express 
his opinion. 
4. When the shareholder's equity after auditing subtracts what is not affirmed by 
registered accountants or department concerned, it is less than registered 
capital. 
5. When last FY's profit is adjusted by the latest audited financial report, the 
result is that the company has suffered losses for two fiscal years. 
6. In case a company's financial condition is considered abnormal by the stock 
exchanges or China Security Regulatory Committee. 
If a listed company has any of the following phenomena, it is considered abnormal in 
other aspects: 
1. Because of natural disasters or serious accidents, the main business equipment 
suffered serious damages and the company's production is forced to stop 
and have no hope to restore production in three months. 
2. A company is involved in a lawsuit or arbitration and has received legal 
documents from the court of arbitration organizations, and it may have the 
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liability to pay a compensation which will surpass 50% of the company's net 
assets listed in latest annual report. 
3. A company's bank account is frozen, affecting the listed company's normal 
operation. 
4. A company has an abnormal situation, affecting the listed company's normal 
operation. 
5. The court accepts the listed company's bankruptcy case and may announce it 
to be bankrupt. 
6. The company's share has been suspended floating temporarily, and with 
approval of China Security Regulatory Committee, it begins to be floated 
again. 
7. In case a company is considered abnormal in other aspects by the stock 
exchanges or China Security Regulatory Committee. 
When a listed company's financial situation is restored to normal and other abnormal 
conditions are removed, it can apply for the canceling of "special treatment" at the 
stock exchanges. The stock exchange will decide whether to cancel the company's 
special treatment or not according to the concrete conditions. 
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